.....ting is a big risk for an insurance corporation's lawyer,hence no "claim" unless you
The Virginian-Pilot
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Tuesday, October 3, 1995 TAG: 9510030252
SECTION: LOCAL PAGE: B1 EDITION: FINAL
SOURCE: BY MARC DAVIS, STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: PORTSMOUTH LENGTH: Long : 178 lines
``I LOST EVERYTHING.'' ATTORNEY'S MISTAKES, LIES HELP COST COUPLE THEIR HOME AND BUSINESS
When Frank and Gayle Galiney found themselves victims of a bad lawyer, their first reaction was to try to get compensation.
The lawyer, Joseph James Basgier Jr. of Virginia Beach - who has surrendered his license and is awaiting sentencing on embezzlement charges - had botched the Galineys' lawsuit. He missed a filing deadline, then covered up by telling the Galineys their case was still pending.
The deception went on for years. Over time, the Galineys lost their home, their business and their credit, in part because of Basgier's mistakes. When they finally discovered the lie, they convinced Basgier to pay them $50,000 for his mistake, plus another $131,000 over 10 years.
But when the monthly payments stopped, the Galineys found themselves up a creek.
They couldn't collect from Basgier's legal malpractice insurance. He had none.
They probably can't collect criminal restitution, even though Basgier has pleaded guilty to embezzling $80,000 from his former law firm and other clients. He didn't embezzle from the Galineys.
Finally, they can't collect from a State Bar fund that pays victims of crooked lawyers. That's because Basgier didn't steal anything from them. He just loused up their case.
And so the Galineys have learned a lesson that victims of Peninsula lawyer David Murray learned in 1992, after Murray stole $42 million from clients, then killed himself:
In Virginia, neither the State Bar nor the state courts guarantees that victims of dishonest or incompetent lawyers are fully protected.
``I thought,'' Gayle Galiney says, ``there are supposed to be systems in place to keep these sort of things from happening.''
Frank Galiney is angrier. ``The bar is definitely there for the good of the attorneys and not the good of the public,'' he says. ``They should have better checks and balances somewhere along the line.''
What went wrong?
It began with a lawsuit filed late.
Galiney owned four bowling alleys and three used-car lots, but he had a problem. He owed a lot of money to a finance company. He had guaranteed many loans from the finance company to his customers, so they could buy his cars.
But then the customers started defaulting on the loans, and Galiney was on the hook.
That was trouble. Over two years, the bad debts ran into serious money. Galiney paid back $125,000 in 1986 and 1987, according to court papers.
Galiney thought this was a fraud. He thought the finance company was making him pay off loans that had nothing to do with his car business. And the debts were threatening his businesses and his home.
So Galiney sued.
``I thought it was a simple matter,'' Galiney says. ``I was going to get my money back.''
Galiney went to a lawyer friend, Robert Steinhilber of Virginia Beach. Steinhilber passed the case to a partner, Jim Basgier, who drew up the lawsuit and filed it in Norfolk Circuit Court. That was in 1988.
For three years, the case bounced from court to court.
By the final bounce, it was too late. The last lawsuit was filed in 1991, beyond the three-year limit.
A judge threw it out. Galiney would get no money.
After an angry confrontation, the Galineys say, Basgier admitted his mistake. ``He laid it on the line,'' Gayle Galiney recalls. ``He could not find a legal remedy for the situation. He started begging and crying.''
So the Galineys struck a deal: To remedy the error, Basgier paid them $50,000 cash and agreed to pay another $131,000 over 10 years. He even signed a promissory note.
But by then, the Galineys had lost their bowling alleys, their car lots and their fancy home in Point Elizabeth. ``I lost everything over this mess,'' Frank Galiney says.
Basgier and his attorney could not be reached for comment. Basgier declined to comment after his criminal hearing in August.
Galiney acknowledges that not everything was the lawyer's fault. Galiney admits making some business mistakes that contributed to his own financial downfall. And he did not really lose everything. He and his wife still live in a comfortable house with a swimming pool near Craney Island.
Still, Galiney says, if he had known the truth about his lawsuit, he might have made different business decisions.
``Maybe I should have been smarter,'' Galiney says, ``but I relied on (him) as an officer of the court.''
After the shock wore off, the Galineys went after Basgier's legal malpractice insurance.
Nine of 10 Virginia lawyers have it. It protects them from a client's claim of injury arising from a mistake, just like a doctor's medical malpractice insurance.
But Basgier didn't have it. He had let his policy lapse, Galiney said.
That was possible because the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Supreme Court do not require lawyers to have malpractice insurance. They simply hope that most lawyers realize the wisdom of insurance.
``We want all of our lawyers to have malpractice coverage,'' says Michael W. Smith, a Richmond attorney who is president of the State Bar. ``It doesn't make any sense not to have it. It would be similar to driving your automobile without insurance. It wouldn't be a very smart idea.''
For a while last year, in response to the Murray disaster, the bar considered requiring malpractice insurance of all lawyers. But a committee rejected the idea, saying it would ``lull the public into a false sense of security.''
``The key point here,'' the committee wrote, ``is that malpractice insurance policies currently exclude dishonest and intentional acts. Thus, mandatory malpractice insurance would have offered no protection to clients against losses like those involved in the Murray case.''
It would, however, have protected clients like Frank Galiney against sloppiness like Basgier's.
``Why don't they require lawyers to have malpractice insurance?'' Galiney asks. ``That at least would be some little benefit to the public.''
Next, the Galineys turned to a little-known State Bar fund. It is called the Client Protection Fund and it pays people who have lost money to dishonest lawyers.
But that has problems, too.
Mainly, the fund is too small - it would go broke if it paid every valid claim. So the State Bar limits how much each wronged client can collect. The cap is $25,000, no matter how big the claim.
The State Bar also will not pay more than 10 percent of the total fund to clients of any single bad lawyer. That way, one attorney's many criminal acts, like Murray's, can't break the bank.
Unfortunately, it also means that victims of one lawyer get very little compensation.
Murray's clients, for example, filed claims for millions of dollars. In the end, 23 clients split $55,000 because the fund had just $550,000 in the bank.
Bar officials know the fund is too small. ``Demands upon the fund will continue to be unmet in significant part, so long as the 10 percent limit remains in force,'' the fund's chairman wrote last year.
So the bar is trying to make it bigger. Every year, the bar is chipping in an extra $200,000 until the fund reaches $3 million. At that rate, it could take a while because the fund also is paying out about $200,000 in claims.
Still, the fund today is triple the size it was during the Murray scandal - $1.5 million, as of last month. That means it can pay up to $150,000 for one bad lawyer.
To victims of Basgier's embezzlements, the fund has already paid a total of $30,080, including one payment for the maximum $25,000. Another claim is pending.
But the Galineys got nothing.
``They told us we're not eligible,'' Gayle Galiney says. ``It's only for people that lawyers actually took money away from.''
Finally, the Galineys sought criminal restitution from Basgier.
That probably will fail, too.
In August, Basgier pleaded guilty to three counts of embezzlement. In return, prosecutors dropped one count of forgery - the only count related to the Galiney matter.
Technically, that means the Galineys are not victims of Basgier's crimes.
Despite this, a prosecutor asked Judge Edward Hanson in August to order $50,000 restitution from Basgier to Frank Galiney. ``He lost his business as a result of the defendant's actions,'' prosecutor William Monroe argued.
The judge disagreed. If the Galineys want their money, Hanson said, they will have to sue Basgier.
Hanson will officially rule on the restitution issue Oct. 10, when Basgier is formally sentenced. The plea agreement calls for no jail time, but 10 years of court-ordered good behavior.
Basgier, 44, has already lost his law license. He surrendered it in March 1993 with disciplinary charges pending at the State Bar. He now works as a title searcher.
``I really have no desire to see Jim (Basgier) go to jail,'' Frank Galiney says. ``He's going to be punished enough in life with what he's lost. In essence, he's lost more than I have. . .
``But if nothing else, he should be held accountable to everyone. I would be happy with one-third of what he owes me. Just something.'' ILLUSTRATION: MOTOYA NAKAMURA
Staff
[Color Photo]
Gayle and Frank Galiney probably won't be able to collect much from
the lawyer who misled them. He had no malpractice insurance.
PAYING FOR LAWYERS' MISDEEDS
Year-by-year payouts from the Virginia State Bar's Client Protection
Fund, in thousands of dollars.
STAFF Chart
SOURCE: Virginia State Bar
melissadaylong.blogspot.com
Thursday, April 17, 2008
Friday, March 28, 2008
Proudly graduating malicious prosecutors/stupid attorneys for a "plethora" of years
Jill Williams.blogspot.com
JohnThomasHubert.blogspot.com
ET AL.......
JohnThomasHubert.blogspot.com
ET AL.......
a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court.
a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court.
IN RE GAULT
387 U.S. 1; 18 L. Ed. 2d 527; 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)
Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court.
. . . On Monday, June 8, 1965, at about 10 a.m., Gerald Francis Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County. Gerald was then still subject to a six months' probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964, as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady's purse. The police action on June 8 was taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs. Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers made lewd or indecent remarks. It will suffice for purposes of this opinion to say that the remarks or questions put to her were of the irritatingly, offensive, adolescent, sex variety.
At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children's Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at about 6 o'clock, Gerald was not there. Gerald's older brother was sent to look for him at the trailer home of the Lewis family. He apparently learned then that Gerald was in custody: He so informed his mother. The two of them went to the Detention Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault "why Jerry was there" and said that a hearing would be held in Juvenile Court at 3 o'clock the following day, June 9.
Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day, June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults. Indeed, none of them saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964. The petition was entirely formal. It made no reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It recited only that "said minor is under the age of eighteen years and is in need of the protection of this Honorable court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor;" It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding "the care and custody of said minor." Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the petition.
On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald's father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. Our information about the proceedings and the subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding conducted two months later. From this, it appears that at the June 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone call. There was conflict as to what he said. His mother recalled that Gerald said he only dialed Mrs. Cook's number and handed the telephone to his friend, Ronald. Officer Flagg recalled that Gerald had admitted making the lewd remarks. Judge McGhee testified that Gerald "admitted making one of these [lewd] statements." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he would "think about it." Gerald was taken back to the Detention Home. He was not sent to his own home with his parents. On June 11 or 12, after having been detained since June 8, Gerald was released and driven home. There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he was released. At 5 p.m. on the day of Gerald's release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows:
Mrs. Gault:
Judge McGhee has set Monday, June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's delinquency.
/s/Flagg
At the appointed time on Monday, June 15, Gerald, his father and mother, Ronald Lewis and his father, and Officer Flagg and Henderson were present before Judge McGhee. Witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding differed in their recollections of Gerald's testimony at the June 15 hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Gault recalled that Gerald again testified that he had only dialed the number and that the other boy had made the remarks. Officer Flagg agreed that at this hearing Gerald did not admit making the lewd remarks. But Judge McGhee recalled that "there was some admission again of some of the lewd statements. He -- he didn't admit any of the more serious lewd statements." Again, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. Mrs. Gault asked that Mrs. Cook be present "so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone." The Juvenile Judge said "she didn't have to be present at that hearing." The judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or communicate with her at any time. Probation Officer Flagg had talked to her once--over the telephone on June 9.
At this June 15 hearing a "referral report" made by the probation officers was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This listed the charge as "Lewd Phone Calls." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until 21] unless sooner discharged by due process of law." . . .
No appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and referred by it to the Superior Court for hearing.
At the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, Judge McGhee was vigorously cross-examined as to the basis for his actions. He testified that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on probation. He was asked "under what section of . . . the code you found the boy delinquent."
His answer is set forth in the margin. In substance, he concluded that Gerald came within ARS 8-201-6(a), which specifies that a "delinquent child" includes one "who has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof." The law which Gerald was found to have violated . . . provides that a person who "in the presence of hearing of any woman or child . . . uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . ." The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. The judge also testified that he acted under ARS 8-201-6(d) which includes in the definition of a "delinquent child" one who, as the judge phrased it, is "habitually involved in immoral matters."
Asked about this basis for his conclusion that Gerald was "habitually involved in immoral matters," the judge testified, somewhat vaguely, that two years earlier, on July 2, 1962, a "referral" was made concerning Gerald, "where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it." The judge said there was "no hearing," and "no accusation" relating to this incident, "because of lack of material foundation." But it seems to have remained in his mind as a relevant factor. The judge also testified that Gerald had admitted making other nuisance phone calls in the past which, as the judge recalled the boy's testimony, were "silly calls, or funny calls, or something like that."
The Superior Court dismissed the writ, and appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. . . .
The Supreme Court handed down an elaborate and wide-ranging opinion affirming dismissal of the writ and stated the court's conclusions as to the issues raised by appellants and other aspects of the juvenile process. In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this Court, appellants do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied:
1. Notice of the charges;
2. Right to counsel;
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
4. Privilege against self-incrimination;
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings;
and
6. Right to appellate review.
. . . From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated--
indeed even insisted upon--between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. In addition to the specific problems involved in the present case, for example, it has been held that the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury. It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.
The history and theory underlying this development are well-known, but a recapitulation is necessary for purposes of this opinion. The juvenile court movement began in this country at the end of the last century. From the Juvenile Court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The constitutionality of Juvenile Court laws has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." The child--especially good, as they saw it--was to be made "to feel that he is the object of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae. The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders. In these old days, the state was not deemed to have authority to accord them fewer procedural rights than adults.
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effective performing their custodial functions--that is, if the child is "delinquent"--the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is--to say the least--debatable. And in practice, . . . the results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts. . . ." The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: "Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process. . . .
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. But it is important, we think that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment or folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. This Commission's Report states:
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously; 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice before. * * *
Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which we have referred, could not lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a "criminal." The juvenile offender is now classed as a "delinquent." There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term "criminal" applied to adults. It is also emphasized that in practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions. . . .
Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help "to save him from a downward career." Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness--in short, the essentials of due process--may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. . . .
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence--and of limited practical meaning--that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemestic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. . . ." Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it--was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected? Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us . . . the points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute. The essential difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case. The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18. . . .
Appellants allege that the Arizona Juvenile Code is unconstitutional or alternatively that the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were constitutionally defective because of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. . . .
. . . Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." It is obvious that no purpose of shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for hearing is served by the procedure approved by the court below. The "initial hearing" in the present case was a hearing on the merits. Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. . . .
Appellants charge that the Juvenile Court proceedings were fatally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their right to counsel, and proceeded with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in the absence of counsel for the child and his parents or an express waiver of the right thereto. . . . A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
. . .
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. . . .
Appellants urge that the writ of habeas corpus should have been granted because of the denial of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the Juvenile Court hearings, and because the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed. . . .
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and--in a philosophical sense--insists upon the equality of the individual and the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. . . .
Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued that juvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and therefore the privilege should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be inculpatory.
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the grounds that these cannot lead to "criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over half of the States, there is no even assurance that the juvenile will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult "criminals." In those States juveniles may be placed in or transferred to adult penal institutions after having been found "delinquent" by a juvenile court. For this purpose, at least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil" And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty--a command which this Court has broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for freedom. . . .
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique--but not in principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. . . .
Absent a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination were not essential for a finding of "delinquency. . . ."
. . . We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.
Appellants urge that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because, as construed by its Supreme Court, "there is no right of appeal from a juvenile court order. . . ." The court held that there is no right to a transcript because there is no right to appeal and because the proceedings are confidential and any record must be destroyed after a prescribed period of time. Whether a transcript or other recording is made, it held, is a matter for the discretion of the juvenile court. . . .
As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black, concurring. . . .
Mr. Justice White, concurring. . . .
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part. . . .
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting.
The Court today uses an obscure Arizona case as a vehicle to impose upon thousands of juvenile courts throughout the Nation restrictions that the Constitution made applicable to adversary criminal trials. I believe the Court's decision is wholly unsound as a matter of constitutional law, and sadly unwise as a matter of judicial policy.
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.
In the last 70 years many dedicated men and women have devoted their professional lives to the enlightened task of bringing us out of the dark world of Charles Dickens in meeting our responsibilities to the child in our society. The result has been the creation in this century of a system of juvenile and family courts in each of the 50 States. There can be no denying that in many areas the performance of these agencies has fallen disappointingly short of the hopes and dreams of the courageous pioneers who first conceived them. For a variety of reasons, the reality has sometimes not even approached the ideal, and much remains to be accomplished in the administration of public juvenile and family agencies--in personnel, in planning, in financing, perhaps in the formulation of wholly new approaches.
I possess neither the specialized experience nor the expert knowledge to predict with any certainty where may lie the brightest hope for progress in dealing with the serious problems of juvenile delinquency. But I am certain that the answer does not lie in the Court's opinion in this case, which serves to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. . . .
IN RE GAULT
387 U.S. 1; 18 L. Ed. 2d 527; 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)
Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court.
. . . On Monday, June 8, 1965, at about 10 a.m., Gerald Francis Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Gila County. Gerald was then still subject to a six months' probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964, as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady's purse. The police action on June 8 was taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs. Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers made lewd or indecent remarks. It will suffice for purposes of this opinion to say that the remarks or questions put to her were of the irritatingly, offensive, adolescent, sex variety.
At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left at the home. No other steps were taken to advise them that their son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children's Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at about 6 o'clock, Gerald was not there. Gerald's older brother was sent to look for him at the trailer home of the Lewis family. He apparently learned then that Gerald was in custody: He so informed his mother. The two of them went to the Detention Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault "why Jerry was there" and said that a hearing would be held in Juvenile Court at 3 o'clock the following day, June 9.
Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day, June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults. Indeed, none of them saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964. The petition was entirely formal. It made no reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It recited only that "said minor is under the age of eighteen years and is in need of the protection of this Honorable court; [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor;" It prayed for a hearing and an order regarding "the care and custody of said minor." Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the petition.
On June 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in chambers. Gerald's father was not there. He was at work out of the city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or recording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings was prepared. Our information about the proceedings and the subsequent hearing on June 15, derives entirely from the testimony of the Juvenile Court Judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault and Officer Flagg at the habeas corpus proceeding conducted two months later. From this, it appears that at the June 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone call. There was conflict as to what he said. His mother recalled that Gerald said he only dialed Mrs. Cook's number and handed the telephone to his friend, Ronald. Officer Flagg recalled that Gerald had admitted making the lewd remarks. Judge McGhee testified that Gerald "admitted making one of these [lewd] statements." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he would "think about it." Gerald was taken back to the Detention Home. He was not sent to his own home with his parents. On June 11 or 12, after having been detained since June 8, Gerald was released and driven home. There is no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the Detention Home or why he was released. At 5 p.m. on the day of Gerald's release, Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg. It was on plain paper, not letterhead. Its entire text was as follows:
Mrs. Gault:
Judge McGhee has set Monday, June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's delinquency.
/s/Flagg
At the appointed time on Monday, June 15, Gerald, his father and mother, Ronald Lewis and his father, and Officer Flagg and Henderson were present before Judge McGhee. Witnesses at the habeas corpus proceeding differed in their recollections of Gerald's testimony at the June 15 hearing. Mr. and Mrs. Gault recalled that Gerald again testified that he had only dialed the number and that the other boy had made the remarks. Officer Flagg agreed that at this hearing Gerald did not admit making the lewd remarks. But Judge McGhee recalled that "there was some admission again of some of the lewd statements. He -- he didn't admit any of the more serious lewd statements." Again, the complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. Mrs. Gault asked that Mrs. Cook be present "so she could see which boy that done the talking, the dirty talking over the phone." The Juvenile Judge said "she didn't have to be present at that hearing." The judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or communicate with her at any time. Probation Officer Flagg had talked to her once--over the telephone on June 9.
At this June 15 hearing a "referral report" made by the probation officers was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This listed the charge as "Lewd Phone Calls." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until 21] unless sooner discharged by due process of law." . . .
No appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases. On August 3, 1964, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona and referred by it to the Superior Court for hearing.
At the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, Judge McGhee was vigorously cross-examined as to the basis for his actions. He testified that he had taken into account the fact that Gerald was on probation. He was asked "under what section of . . . the code you found the boy delinquent."
His answer is set forth in the margin. In substance, he concluded that Gerald came within ARS 8-201-6(a), which specifies that a "delinquent child" includes one "who has violated a law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof." The law which Gerald was found to have violated . . . provides that a person who "in the presence of hearing of any woman or child . . . uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . ." The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. The judge also testified that he acted under ARS 8-201-6(d) which includes in the definition of a "delinquent child" one who, as the judge phrased it, is "habitually involved in immoral matters."
Asked about this basis for his conclusion that Gerald was "habitually involved in immoral matters," the judge testified, somewhat vaguely, that two years earlier, on July 2, 1962, a "referral" was made concerning Gerald, "where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department about it." The judge said there was "no hearing," and "no accusation" relating to this incident, "because of lack of material foundation." But it seems to have remained in his mind as a relevant factor. The judge also testified that Gerald had admitted making other nuisance phone calls in the past which, as the judge recalled the boy's testimony, were "silly calls, or funny calls, or something like that."
The Superior Court dismissed the writ, and appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court. . . .
The Supreme Court handed down an elaborate and wide-ranging opinion affirming dismissal of the writ and stated the court's conclusions as to the issues raised by appellants and other aspects of the juvenile process. In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this Court, appellants do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following basic rights are denied:
1. Notice of the charges;
2. Right to counsel;
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
4. Privilege against self-incrimination;
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings;
and
6. Right to appellate review.
. . . From the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated--
indeed even insisted upon--between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles. In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles. In addition to the specific problems involved in the present case, for example, it has been held that the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury. It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.
The history and theory underlying this development are well-known, but a recapitulation is necessary for purposes of this opinion. The juvenile court movement began in this country at the end of the last century. From the Juvenile Court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The constitutionality of Juvenile Court laws has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." The child--especially good, as they saw it--was to be made "to feel that he is the object of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
These results were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae. The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like adult offenders. In these old days, the state was not deemed to have authority to accord them fewer procedural rights than adults.
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to custody." He can be made to attorn to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effective performing their custodial functions--that is, if the child is "delinquent"--the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is--to say the least--debatable. And in practice, . . . the results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts. . . ." The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. The Chairman of the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court Judges has recently observed: "Unfortunately, loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars, either singly or in combination, all too often, have resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in a denial of due process. . . .
It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. But it is important, we think that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment or folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism conducted by the Stanford Research Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. This Commission's Report states:
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles referred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously; 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice before. * * *
Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates among juveniles to which we have referred, could not lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders. We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a "criminal." The juvenile offender is now classed as a "delinquent." There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term "criminal" applied to adults. It is also emphasized that in practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions. . . .
Further, it is urged that the juvenile benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help "to save him from a downward career." Then, as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness--in short, the essentials of due process--may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned. . . .
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence--and of limited practical meaning--that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemestic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours. . . ." Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it--was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected? Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us . . . the points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute. The essential difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case. The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18. . . .
Appellants allege that the Arizona Juvenile Code is unconstitutional or alternatively that the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were constitutionally defective because of failure to provide adequate notice of the hearings. . . .
. . . Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." It is obvious that no purpose of shielding the child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken into custody and scheduled for hearing is served by the procedure approved by the court below. The "initial hearing" in the present case was a hearing on the merits. Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a conceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. . . .
Appellants charge that the Juvenile Court proceedings were fatally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their right to counsel, and proceeded with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in the absence of counsel for the child and his parents or an express waiver of the right thereto. . . . A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
. . .
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. . . .
Appellants urge that the writ of habeas corpus should have been granted because of the denial of the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the Juvenile Court hearings, and because the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed. . . .
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and--in a philosophical sense--insists upon the equality of the individual and the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privilege is comprehensive. . . .
Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued that juvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and therefore the privilege should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may, for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be inculpatory.
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the grounds that these cannot lead to "criminal" involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over half of the States, there is no even assurance that the juvenile will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult "criminals." In those States juveniles may be placed in or transferred to adult penal institutions after having been found "delinquent" by a juvenile court. For this purpose, at least, commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil" And our Constitution guarantees that no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty--a command which this Court has broadly applied and generously implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office in mankind's battle for freedom. . . .
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique--but not in principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. . . .
Absent a valid confession adequate to support the determination of the Juvenile Court, confrontation and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination were not essential for a finding of "delinquency. . . ."
. . . We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.
Appellants urge that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because, as construed by its Supreme Court, "there is no right of appeal from a juvenile court order. . . ." The court held that there is no right to a transcript because there is no right to appeal and because the proceedings are confidential and any record must be destroyed after a prescribed period of time. Whether a transcript or other recording is made, it held, is a matter for the discretion of the juvenile court. . . .
As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record, and to impose upon the Juvenile Judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black, concurring. . . .
Mr. Justice White, concurring. . . .
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part. . . .
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting.
The Court today uses an obscure Arizona case as a vehicle to impose upon thousands of juvenile courts throughout the Nation restrictions that the Constitution made applicable to adversary criminal trials. I believe the Court's decision is wholly unsound as a matter of constitutional law, and sadly unwise as a matter of judicial policy.
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.
In the last 70 years many dedicated men and women have devoted their professional lives to the enlightened task of bringing us out of the dark world of Charles Dickens in meeting our responsibilities to the child in our society. The result has been the creation in this century of a system of juvenile and family courts in each of the 50 States. There can be no denying that in many areas the performance of these agencies has fallen disappointingly short of the hopes and dreams of the courageous pioneers who first conceived them. For a variety of reasons, the reality has sometimes not even approached the ideal, and much remains to be accomplished in the administration of public juvenile and family agencies--in personnel, in planning, in financing, perhaps in the formulation of wholly new approaches.
I possess neither the specialized experience nor the expert knowledge to predict with any certainty where may lie the brightest hope for progress in dealing with the serious problems of juvenile delinquency. But I am certain that the answer does not lie in the Court's opinion in this case, which serves to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution. . . .
Tuesday, September 04, 2007
Don't surrender 'cause you can win
Thursday, May 24, 2007
'Cause love's gonna conquer it all, all
[ CELINE DION Lyrics ]
"That's the way it is"
All The Way...A Decade Of Song
(center text)
I can read your mind and I know your story
I see what you're going through
It's an uphill climb, and I'm feeling sorry
But I know it will come to you
Don't surrender 'cause you can win
In this thing called love
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When you question me for a simple answer
I don't know what to say, no
But it's plain to see, if you stick together
You're gonna find a way, yeah
So don't surrender 'cause you can win
In this thing called love
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When life is empty with no tomorrow
And loneliness starts to call
Baby, don't worry, forget your sorrow
'Cause love's gonna conquer it all, all
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
That's the way it is
That's the way it is, babe
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is.
"That's the way it is"
All The Way...A Decade Of Song
(center text)
I can read your mind and I know your story
I see what you're going through
It's an uphill climb, and I'm feeling sorry
But I know it will come to you
Don't surrender 'cause you can win
In this thing called love
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When you question me for a simple answer
I don't know what to say, no
But it's plain to see, if you stick together
You're gonna find a way, yeah
So don't surrender 'cause you can win
In this thing called love
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When life is empty with no tomorrow
And loneliness starts to call
Baby, don't worry, forget your sorrow
'Cause love's gonna conquer it all, all
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
When you want it the most there's no easy way out
When you're ready to go and your heart's left in doubt
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is
That's the way it is
That's the way it is, babe
Don't give up on your faith
Love comes to those who believe it
And that's the way it is.
Labels: Corpus Christi, creed, love
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
commissary deal ~Close ties helped seal commissary deal......Beneficial
Web Posted: 07/29/2007 12:38 AM CDT
Todd Bensman
Express-News
In the summer of 2005, a determined effort by Bexar County Sheriff Ralph Lopez to privatize the county jail commissary stores — which generated some $2 million a year in gross sales — was on the verge of foundering.
In Texas, elected sheriffs enjoy wide leeway and independence in managing and operating county jails, including the jail commissary, where inmates can purchase everything from snacks to toiletries.
But Lopez had met strong resistance from several board members of a nonprofit "Benevolent Fund" corporation that he had established several years earlier to run the commissaries. They saw no good reason to contract out the operation to a private vendor of Lopez's choice, Premier Management Enterprises, or any other business.
The deal seemed all but dead when Premier's fortunes took an abrupt turn for the better. Some board members, including the chairman who staunchly opposed the deal, resigned. The new leaders of the board along with a new member, all allies of Lopez, would push the Premier contract through the rough patch.
Within weeks of the contract approval by the sheriff's Benevolent Fund board in August 2005, Lopez, an avid golfer known to travel the country playing at elite resorts, was visiting Costa Rica, where he spent time on the greens with Premier officials at the expense of Premier's principal owners, Patrick and Michael LeBlanc.
Later, less than a month after the contract was officially inked, board Chairman John Reynolds was allegedly depositing the first of four checks totaling $27,500 from Premier into accounts named for charities that were "shells" and "fronts," according to court documents filed by a district attorney investigator.
And within four months, board Vice Chairman John E. Curran III was preparing to cut his own financial side deal with Premier. Curran's temporary worker company, PersoNet, now provides the very commissary employees that Premier uses to carry out the contract Curran helped along as vice chairman.
In a recent interview, Curran said his own ongoing business with Premier, based in Louisiana, to supply the jail commissaries with about a dozen temporary workers is worth between $12,000 and $15,000 a year to him.
Curran said he did nothing criminally or ethically wrong, and that he verbally disclosed the relationship with Premier to the sheriff and abstained on relevant votes once his company had Premier's business in April 2006.
"I had the sheriff's permission prior to doing any business with Premier, and I asked the board's permission. Both granted it," Curran said. "I wanted to be sure there was no conflict of interest. I did not want anyone to find out in the newspaper, or any other way, that one of my clients was Premier."
The sheriff did not reply to several telephone messages last week. Neither Reynolds nor his attorney returned messages requesting comment for this article.
Even if no laws were broken, disclosures about Premier's generosity toward elected and appointed officials who have helped it win lucrative contracts have left — at the least — a public perception of wrongdoing in how the sheriff and his allies conduct business.
"Ugh," Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff groaned when told of Premier's arrangement with Curran's company. "This thing's worse than it already has been. This is not good at all. Nothing about it looks good. Whether you've violated a criminal act or an ethics issue, or neither, it's still not appropriate behavior. It looks bad."
District Attorney Susan Reed's public corruption investigators, joined by the FBI and the Texas Rangers, are conducting interviews and have sought grand jury subpoenas regarding Reynolds. On several occasions, he's invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to subpoenas, according to court documents. First Assistant District Attorney Cliff Herberg said his office would not discuss the investigation.
Curran acknowledged that investigators have questioned him about PersoNet's relationship with Premier.
Asked if he had ever shared any of the Premier revenue with Reynolds or anyone else, Curran replied: "I'm not sharing my revenue with anyone but my kids. My staff is not donating to anybody. There's just nothing there."
One of Premier's attorneys, Tonya Webber of Corpus Christi, wrote in an e-mail reply, in part, that: "Temp-to-hire services are a prudent business practice. This was an arms-length transaction documented in writing with an experienced temp-to-hire company." Webber said she wasn't at liberty to respond to specific e-mailed questions, such as why Premier chose a Benevolent Fund board member's company, rather than more than a dozen other area licensed temp worker companies.
Created in 2002 by Lopez, the Benevolent Fund appears to be the only one that exists in the state for the purpose of running a jail commissary. Sheriffs in other counties have contracted the job directly with private companies in line with state laws that allow them to do so without competitive bidding.
Because of the Benevolent Fund's unique existence and function, said Lauri Saathoff, a spokeswoman for the Texas attorney general's office, the question of how the state's conflict of interest law might apply has never come up.
"We don't have any previous attorney general's opinions for a board like this," Saathoff said in response to an Express-News request.
Three-way alliance
Curran's ties to the sheriff and Reynolds date to the late 1990s when Curran worked as a senior analyst in the Bexar County Personnel Division. Close alliances were built among the three over the years, each assuming positions of potential benefit to the others.
Lopez and Reynolds have known each other for at least 15 years; Lopez has hired Reynolds as his campaign manager for years and once made Reynolds his chief of staff.
Curran began serving on various boards alongside Reynolds, doing business with a deputies' union considered aligned with Lopez, and working on the sheriff's campaigns that Reynolds managed.
While Reynolds was chairman of the West San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, which he helped found, Curran was treasurer.
Reynolds also nominated Curran in 2004 for appointment to the Alamo Workforce Development board, one of 28 such boards across the state that spend Texas Workforce Commission funds to help the unemployed find work.
Curran and Reynolds also share a connection through the Bexar County Sheriff's Deputies Law Enforcement Organization's union. The fact that LEO routinely hires Reynolds as its paid lobbyist has led to the perception among some deputies that Lopez wields some influence over the organization.
LEO also has given consulting contracts to Curran to conduct salary surveys the union uses to justify pay raise requests, he said. And Lopez's wife, Nancy, served at one time with Reynolds on a now-defunct nonprofit fundraising arm of LEO.
Curran, for his part, said he has donated PersoNet's "time and energy" to man phone banks soliciting past Lopez election campaign contributors and will again for the sheriff's 2008 re-election campaign.
When Lopez founded the Benevolent Fund, Curran was among the first whom the sheriff asked to serve on it.
The alliance between Curran, Reynolds and the sheriff would come into play at a critical moment during the summer of 2005, in ways that would yield fruit for more than just Premier.
Opposition to proposed contract
Starting in early 2005, when commissary revenues were approaching record highs of $2 million under Benevolent Fund board management, Lopez began pushing for Premier to run the jail annex commissary, the smaller of two, on a six-month trial basis. If that worked out, the contract would be expanded to the main jail commissary.
Rather than contract out the commissary at first, Lopez had opted to set up a Benevolent Fund with a seven-member board to do the job in-house. He has authority to nominate and appoint members.
Lopez said last month that he later wanted to switch to Premier because the commissary operations were outgrowing the limited expertise of board members and it was time for professional management.
"None of us had experience," Lopez said. "Running a jail is not just putting guys in jail. It's detention ministries; it's banking and other services. It's all comprehensive."
Some of the sheriff's subordinates on the board immediately opposed the change. But the endeavor did not run into serious trouble until the eve of a scheduled board vote on the pilot contract June 22, 2005.
The chairman at the time, Deputy Chief Amadeo Ortiz, released the results of a background investigation of Premier that he had quietly commissioned from the Houston law firm McFall, Sherwood & Breitbeil. The report was generally critical of Premier and cited specific examples where another company in which the LeBlancs also were shareholders, LCS Corrections Services Inc., had faced legal challenges to their operations.
The background report — and a financial analysis projecting an initial revenue loss of $103,790 if Premier took over — raised sufficient concern for Reynolds to table the Premier contract that day, according to meeting minutes and two former board members. Ortiz, who resigned from the board shortly after that meeting and is running for sheriff against Lopez, said he believes he knows why.
"It would have failed a vote at that time," said Ortiz, guessing the board would have voted 4-2 against Premier. "My fellow board members didn't like the contract because there was nothing wrong with the way the commissary was being run."
Even the sheriff momentarily wavered in his support for Premier because of the background report. But Lopez was soon pushing again. And in the sheriff's corner, Ortiz and another board member said, were the only two who had supported the proposal all along and who would go on to break the stalemate: Curran and Reynolds, "the two Johns," as Ortiz and other board members sometimes referred to them.
Doing 'business with friends'
On Aug. 9, 2005, Reynolds and Curran called a special meeting. Ortiz had by then resigned, and the two other board members were out of town, at least one of whom was firmly opposed.
Reynolds and Curran were joined by Dr. Bert Cecconi, a 71-year-old dentist and occasional candidate for local political office who had recently been added to the board. Only weeks earlier Reynolds has asked him to join the board as a favor to the sheriff, Cecconi recalled in an interview last week. He said he'd gotten to know Reynolds and Lopez over the years at Saturday morning community breakfast meetings downtown.
The three, enough for a quorum, elected Reynolds the new board chairman and Curran the new vice chairman. Lopez put in a brief but rare appearance at the meeting.
Then, according to meeting minutes, the trio "approved and unanimously recommends implementation immediately" of the Premier annex commissary tryout program.
Curran acknowledged the purpose of that Aug. 9 special meeting.
"That meeting was called to help get things going forward," he said. "We were just trying to coordinate it to get things up and going."
Cecconi, who described himself as a "passive member" of the board, said he served for just four meetings, dropping off shortly after signing the Premier contract.
Cecconi was given to believe the Premier deal was a routine matter requiring little scrutiny.
"To me, I thought it was like a machine with Cokes coming out of it or something. I didn't know it was a major deal," Cecconi said last week about transferring the $2 million a year jail commissary operations to Premier. "I probably just said, 'OK.' I didn't give it much thought, for better or for worse."
Later that month, from Aug. 20-23, the sheriff, who frequently played golf with Premier's owners, traveled to Costa Rica, his office calendar shows. Lopez recalled last month that the LeBlancs paid all of his expenses to Costa Rica for an undisclosed business trip, unrelated to county affairs, that included tee time.
Lopez still refuses to fully disclose the business purpose of the trip, only that it involved a favor to his Premier friends, a foreign ambassador and a senator, neither of whom he would name in deference to a confidentiality agreement he said he struck with all involved. He also said he was not paid.
"The LeBlanc people paid for the Costa Rica trip," the sheriff said. "I was over there carrying my resume with me for credibility for part of the trip."
From August on, Lopez and Premier would encounter no more dissent.
After several resignations, the board, under the guidance of Chairman Reynolds and Vice Chairman Curran, would reconstitute itself with new members who would continue clearing the path for Premier's pilot six-month contract.
On Oct. 19, 2005, Cecconi, as board secretary, signed the contract with Premier for the pilot program, a copy of the agreement shows. A short time later, Cecconi dropped off the board. He told the Express-News his dental practice had gotten too busy.
About three weeks after the contract was signed, Premier wrote a $5,014 check for "consulting" to Systems Analysts Inc., described as Reynolds' "alter ego," according to allegations by district attorney investigators. Three more Premier checks, totaling another $22,500, to Reynolds-controlled accounts would follow, according to court filings.
Webber, Premier's attorney, said last month when asked about the checks that there is no evidence of Premier being connected to any alleged wrongdoing.
Curran's firm gets hired
Once Premier had its signed the pilot contract, Curran said a company official asked him for advice about staffing the limited operation.
Premier was going to need only four of its own workers. Curran said he offered to let Premier conduct interviews in the offices of PersoNet, free of charge, as a favor.
As vice chairman, Curran continued to consider and discuss Premier's status until about February 2006, by which time the tryout period was more than half over, and it was clear to board members that Premier would secure a five-year contract to run both jail commissaries.
Curran confirmed that was about when Premier first broached the topic of his company getting paid to provide commissary workers for the anticipated expansion. He said he tried to refer the business elsewhere but that the company insisted on PersoNet.
"They said, 'We need employees,'" Curran recalled. "I recommended a couple of different avenues for them because I am in the business, and they chose not to follow those, so ..."
While there are a dozen licensed temporary staffing companies in the greater San Antonio area, Curran said Premier preferred to do business with him because "I guess it's all networking. You like to do business with friends."
During the February 2006 board meeting, minutes show, Reynolds disclosed Curran's pending business relationship with Premier. The sheriff, Reynolds announced, had requested that Curran's company "bid" on work to supply Premier with workers.
Curran's fellow board members then approved a motion that he recuse himself "from voting on matters that may create a conflict of interest with the (Benevolent) Fund's activities," according to the minutes.
When the time came for the Benevolent Fund to extend the contract in April 2006, Curran abstained. PersoNet had penned its deal with Premier.
Once Premier had all the commissary business, the Benevolent Fund no longer needed to employ the 13 commissary workers. Some were laid off; others were encouraged to reapply to Premier for their old jobs, at substantially lower pay and with no benefits, according to two former employees.
PersoNet handled the initial reapplication process, bringing some of the old commissary employees into PersoNet's fold as temporary workers. It also became the equivalent of Premier's human resources department, outsourced.
Curran said he hopes his company grows with Premier, which has contracts elsewhere in South Texas.
"We want them to do well, both as a board member and as a client," Curran said. "Their success — just like all my other clients' success is — if I can help them be more successful, then I'm successful.
"That's business."
tbensman@express-news.net
News Researcher Julie Domel contributed to this report.
Todd Bensman
Express-News
In the summer of 2005, a determined effort by Bexar County Sheriff Ralph Lopez to privatize the county jail commissary stores — which generated some $2 million a year in gross sales — was on the verge of foundering.
In Texas, elected sheriffs enjoy wide leeway and independence in managing and operating county jails, including the jail commissary, where inmates can purchase everything from snacks to toiletries.
But Lopez had met strong resistance from several board members of a nonprofit "Benevolent Fund" corporation that he had established several years earlier to run the commissaries. They saw no good reason to contract out the operation to a private vendor of Lopez's choice, Premier Management Enterprises, or any other business.
The deal seemed all but dead when Premier's fortunes took an abrupt turn for the better. Some board members, including the chairman who staunchly opposed the deal, resigned. The new leaders of the board along with a new member, all allies of Lopez, would push the Premier contract through the rough patch.
Within weeks of the contract approval by the sheriff's Benevolent Fund board in August 2005, Lopez, an avid golfer known to travel the country playing at elite resorts, was visiting Costa Rica, where he spent time on the greens with Premier officials at the expense of Premier's principal owners, Patrick and Michael LeBlanc.
Later, less than a month after the contract was officially inked, board Chairman John Reynolds was allegedly depositing the first of four checks totaling $27,500 from Premier into accounts named for charities that were "shells" and "fronts," according to court documents filed by a district attorney investigator.
And within four months, board Vice Chairman John E. Curran III was preparing to cut his own financial side deal with Premier. Curran's temporary worker company, PersoNet, now provides the very commissary employees that Premier uses to carry out the contract Curran helped along as vice chairman.
In a recent interview, Curran said his own ongoing business with Premier, based in Louisiana, to supply the jail commissaries with about a dozen temporary workers is worth between $12,000 and $15,000 a year to him.
Curran said he did nothing criminally or ethically wrong, and that he verbally disclosed the relationship with Premier to the sheriff and abstained on relevant votes once his company had Premier's business in April 2006.
"I had the sheriff's permission prior to doing any business with Premier, and I asked the board's permission. Both granted it," Curran said. "I wanted to be sure there was no conflict of interest. I did not want anyone to find out in the newspaper, or any other way, that one of my clients was Premier."
The sheriff did not reply to several telephone messages last week. Neither Reynolds nor his attorney returned messages requesting comment for this article.
Even if no laws were broken, disclosures about Premier's generosity toward elected and appointed officials who have helped it win lucrative contracts have left — at the least — a public perception of wrongdoing in how the sheriff and his allies conduct business.
"Ugh," Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff groaned when told of Premier's arrangement with Curran's company. "This thing's worse than it already has been. This is not good at all. Nothing about it looks good. Whether you've violated a criminal act or an ethics issue, or neither, it's still not appropriate behavior. It looks bad."
District Attorney Susan Reed's public corruption investigators, joined by the FBI and the Texas Rangers, are conducting interviews and have sought grand jury subpoenas regarding Reynolds. On several occasions, he's invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to subpoenas, according to court documents. First Assistant District Attorney Cliff Herberg said his office would not discuss the investigation.
Curran acknowledged that investigators have questioned him about PersoNet's relationship with Premier.
Asked if he had ever shared any of the Premier revenue with Reynolds or anyone else, Curran replied: "I'm not sharing my revenue with anyone but my kids. My staff is not donating to anybody. There's just nothing there."
One of Premier's attorneys, Tonya Webber of Corpus Christi, wrote in an e-mail reply, in part, that: "Temp-to-hire services are a prudent business practice. This was an arms-length transaction documented in writing with an experienced temp-to-hire company." Webber said she wasn't at liberty to respond to specific e-mailed questions, such as why Premier chose a Benevolent Fund board member's company, rather than more than a dozen other area licensed temp worker companies.
Created in 2002 by Lopez, the Benevolent Fund appears to be the only one that exists in the state for the purpose of running a jail commissary. Sheriffs in other counties have contracted the job directly with private companies in line with state laws that allow them to do so without competitive bidding.
Because of the Benevolent Fund's unique existence and function, said Lauri Saathoff, a spokeswoman for the Texas attorney general's office, the question of how the state's conflict of interest law might apply has never come up.
"We don't have any previous attorney general's opinions for a board like this," Saathoff said in response to an Express-News request.
Three-way alliance
Curran's ties to the sheriff and Reynolds date to the late 1990s when Curran worked as a senior analyst in the Bexar County Personnel Division. Close alliances were built among the three over the years, each assuming positions of potential benefit to the others.
Lopez and Reynolds have known each other for at least 15 years; Lopez has hired Reynolds as his campaign manager for years and once made Reynolds his chief of staff.
Curran began serving on various boards alongside Reynolds, doing business with a deputies' union considered aligned with Lopez, and working on the sheriff's campaigns that Reynolds managed.
While Reynolds was chairman of the West San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, which he helped found, Curran was treasurer.
Reynolds also nominated Curran in 2004 for appointment to the Alamo Workforce Development board, one of 28 such boards across the state that spend Texas Workforce Commission funds to help the unemployed find work.
Curran and Reynolds also share a connection through the Bexar County Sheriff's Deputies Law Enforcement Organization's union. The fact that LEO routinely hires Reynolds as its paid lobbyist has led to the perception among some deputies that Lopez wields some influence over the organization.
LEO also has given consulting contracts to Curran to conduct salary surveys the union uses to justify pay raise requests, he said. And Lopez's wife, Nancy, served at one time with Reynolds on a now-defunct nonprofit fundraising arm of LEO.
Curran, for his part, said he has donated PersoNet's "time and energy" to man phone banks soliciting past Lopez election campaign contributors and will again for the sheriff's 2008 re-election campaign.
When Lopez founded the Benevolent Fund, Curran was among the first whom the sheriff asked to serve on it.
The alliance between Curran, Reynolds and the sheriff would come into play at a critical moment during the summer of 2005, in ways that would yield fruit for more than just Premier.
Opposition to proposed contract
Starting in early 2005, when commissary revenues were approaching record highs of $2 million under Benevolent Fund board management, Lopez began pushing for Premier to run the jail annex commissary, the smaller of two, on a six-month trial basis. If that worked out, the contract would be expanded to the main jail commissary.
Rather than contract out the commissary at first, Lopez had opted to set up a Benevolent Fund with a seven-member board to do the job in-house. He has authority to nominate and appoint members.
Lopez said last month that he later wanted to switch to Premier because the commissary operations were outgrowing the limited expertise of board members and it was time for professional management.
"None of us had experience," Lopez said. "Running a jail is not just putting guys in jail. It's detention ministries; it's banking and other services. It's all comprehensive."
Some of the sheriff's subordinates on the board immediately opposed the change. But the endeavor did not run into serious trouble until the eve of a scheduled board vote on the pilot contract June 22, 2005.
The chairman at the time, Deputy Chief Amadeo Ortiz, released the results of a background investigation of Premier that he had quietly commissioned from the Houston law firm McFall, Sherwood & Breitbeil. The report was generally critical of Premier and cited specific examples where another company in which the LeBlancs also were shareholders, LCS Corrections Services Inc., had faced legal challenges to their operations.
The background report — and a financial analysis projecting an initial revenue loss of $103,790 if Premier took over — raised sufficient concern for Reynolds to table the Premier contract that day, according to meeting minutes and two former board members. Ortiz, who resigned from the board shortly after that meeting and is running for sheriff against Lopez, said he believes he knows why.
"It would have failed a vote at that time," said Ortiz, guessing the board would have voted 4-2 against Premier. "My fellow board members didn't like the contract because there was nothing wrong with the way the commissary was being run."
Even the sheriff momentarily wavered in his support for Premier because of the background report. But Lopez was soon pushing again. And in the sheriff's corner, Ortiz and another board member said, were the only two who had supported the proposal all along and who would go on to break the stalemate: Curran and Reynolds, "the two Johns," as Ortiz and other board members sometimes referred to them.
Doing 'business with friends'
On Aug. 9, 2005, Reynolds and Curran called a special meeting. Ortiz had by then resigned, and the two other board members were out of town, at least one of whom was firmly opposed.
Reynolds and Curran were joined by Dr. Bert Cecconi, a 71-year-old dentist and occasional candidate for local political office who had recently been added to the board. Only weeks earlier Reynolds has asked him to join the board as a favor to the sheriff, Cecconi recalled in an interview last week. He said he'd gotten to know Reynolds and Lopez over the years at Saturday morning community breakfast meetings downtown.
The three, enough for a quorum, elected Reynolds the new board chairman and Curran the new vice chairman. Lopez put in a brief but rare appearance at the meeting.
Then, according to meeting minutes, the trio "approved and unanimously recommends implementation immediately" of the Premier annex commissary tryout program.
Curran acknowledged the purpose of that Aug. 9 special meeting.
"That meeting was called to help get things going forward," he said. "We were just trying to coordinate it to get things up and going."
Cecconi, who described himself as a "passive member" of the board, said he served for just four meetings, dropping off shortly after signing the Premier contract.
Cecconi was given to believe the Premier deal was a routine matter requiring little scrutiny.
"To me, I thought it was like a machine with Cokes coming out of it or something. I didn't know it was a major deal," Cecconi said last week about transferring the $2 million a year jail commissary operations to Premier. "I probably just said, 'OK.' I didn't give it much thought, for better or for worse."
Later that month, from Aug. 20-23, the sheriff, who frequently played golf with Premier's owners, traveled to Costa Rica, his office calendar shows. Lopez recalled last month that the LeBlancs paid all of his expenses to Costa Rica for an undisclosed business trip, unrelated to county affairs, that included tee time.
Lopez still refuses to fully disclose the business purpose of the trip, only that it involved a favor to his Premier friends, a foreign ambassador and a senator, neither of whom he would name in deference to a confidentiality agreement he said he struck with all involved. He also said he was not paid.
"The LeBlanc people paid for the Costa Rica trip," the sheriff said. "I was over there carrying my resume with me for credibility for part of the trip."
From August on, Lopez and Premier would encounter no more dissent.
After several resignations, the board, under the guidance of Chairman Reynolds and Vice Chairman Curran, would reconstitute itself with new members who would continue clearing the path for Premier's pilot six-month contract.
On Oct. 19, 2005, Cecconi, as board secretary, signed the contract with Premier for the pilot program, a copy of the agreement shows. A short time later, Cecconi dropped off the board. He told the Express-News his dental practice had gotten too busy.
About three weeks after the contract was signed, Premier wrote a $5,014 check for "consulting" to Systems Analysts Inc., described as Reynolds' "alter ego," according to allegations by district attorney investigators. Three more Premier checks, totaling another $22,500, to Reynolds-controlled accounts would follow, according to court filings.
Webber, Premier's attorney, said last month when asked about the checks that there is no evidence of Premier being connected to any alleged wrongdoing.
Curran's firm gets hired
Once Premier had its signed the pilot contract, Curran said a company official asked him for advice about staffing the limited operation.
Premier was going to need only four of its own workers. Curran said he offered to let Premier conduct interviews in the offices of PersoNet, free of charge, as a favor.
As vice chairman, Curran continued to consider and discuss Premier's status until about February 2006, by which time the tryout period was more than half over, and it was clear to board members that Premier would secure a five-year contract to run both jail commissaries.
Curran confirmed that was about when Premier first broached the topic of his company getting paid to provide commissary workers for the anticipated expansion. He said he tried to refer the business elsewhere but that the company insisted on PersoNet.
"They said, 'We need employees,'" Curran recalled. "I recommended a couple of different avenues for them because I am in the business, and they chose not to follow those, so ..."
While there are a dozen licensed temporary staffing companies in the greater San Antonio area, Curran said Premier preferred to do business with him because "I guess it's all networking. You like to do business with friends."
During the February 2006 board meeting, minutes show, Reynolds disclosed Curran's pending business relationship with Premier. The sheriff, Reynolds announced, had requested that Curran's company "bid" on work to supply Premier with workers.
Curran's fellow board members then approved a motion that he recuse himself "from voting on matters that may create a conflict of interest with the (Benevolent) Fund's activities," according to the minutes.
When the time came for the Benevolent Fund to extend the contract in April 2006, Curran abstained. PersoNet had penned its deal with Premier.
Once Premier had all the commissary business, the Benevolent Fund no longer needed to employ the 13 commissary workers. Some were laid off; others were encouraged to reapply to Premier for their old jobs, at substantially lower pay and with no benefits, according to two former employees.
PersoNet handled the initial reapplication process, bringing some of the old commissary employees into PersoNet's fold as temporary workers. It also became the equivalent of Premier's human resources department, outsourced.
Curran said he hopes his company grows with Premier, which has contracts elsewhere in South Texas.
"We want them to do well, both as a board member and as a client," Curran said. "Their success — just like all my other clients' success is — if I can help them be more successful, then I'm successful.
"That's business."
tbensman@express-news.net
News Researcher Julie Domel contributed to this report.
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
There is a misconception among some levels of the judicial process has convinced us that it is usually highly counterproductive.
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Trial Ad Notes
Tuesday's Lunchtime Choices
Tomorrow has a couple of trial-practice-related programs during the lunch hour:
* Michael Shadow, a well-respected consultant on effective speaking, is presenting a workshop -- courtesy of Career Services and WSTLA.
* Federal Public Defender Tom Hillier is speaking about his experience representing Ahmed Ressam ("the Millennium Bomber") (Forum on Law and Policy).
I wouldn't want to discourage anyone from attending the library's regular Tuesday Library Lifesavers (this week: selecting a database on Westlaw and starting points for foreign and international legal research) -- but these sound very interesting too.
Big Attorney Fees in Katrina Case
Mississippi had worked out a settlement with State Farm over hundreds of lawsuits and thousands of disputed claims following the insurance company's refusal to pay for damage caused by Hurricane Katrina's storm surge. The lead lawyer representing the state was Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, who received a lot of publicity for his work in the tobacco litigation -- and criticism for the size of his fee award. Katrina Suit May Net Lawyers Up to $46 Million, AP (Law.com), Jan. 26, 2007.
Mistrial Declared After Lawyer Failed to Finish Closing Argument
Mistrial Declared After Lawyer Failed to Finish Closing Argument reports the AP (on law.com), Jan. 29, 2007.
The defense lawyer in an attempted murder case in Farmville, VA, returned to the courtroom after a recess and said that he couldn't continue his closing argument because he had lost his train of thought. The defendant offered to finish the argument himself. The presiding judge declared a mistrial and recommended that the lawyer, a 74-year-old former judge, seek medical treatment.
Milberg Weiss Plaintiff Took Kickbacks
A former ophthalmologist has admitted to taking payments for serving as lead plaintiff in class actions filed by plaintiffs' firm Milberg Weiss. Former Lead Plaintiff's Guilty Plea May Spell Trouble for Lawyer Lerach, The Recorder (law.com), Feb. 1, 2007. See Wikipedia for a summary of the firm's troubles.
How to Deal With the Many Types of Anti-Corporate Jurors
Two litigation consultants (Ken Broda-Bahm and Kevin Boully) offer advice on How to Deal With the Many Types of Anti-Corporate Jurors, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 2007.
People who dislike or distrust corporations fall into different categories:
Anti-corporate individualists, who distrust a corporation's level of power and control, will not share the same views as anti-corporate environmentalists, who disparage the side effects of some forms of corporate behavior. Anti-corporate moralists, who focus on corporate dishonesty above all, will not always agree with anti-corporate populists, who value the common person and draw sharp distinctions between themselves and elite executives. Anti-corporate egalitarians, who inherently mistrust profit itself and resulting concentrations of wealth, differ from anti-corporate nationalists, who fear the transnational influence of corporations on so many facets of life.
There even exist anti-corporate capitalists, who are critical of modern corporations precisely because of the high standards they impose for the responsibility of corporations in a self-policing economic system. Bearing in mind these distinctions and many others, it pays to know why a potential juror may dislike a big company, in order to know whether that juror should serve and, if the juror serves, how he or she might be persuaded.
(emphasis added) It all makes sense, but who knew?
The authors offer different voir dire and trial strategies to address each type.
Stimson Quits Over Boycott Remarks
Remember Charles "Cully" Stimson, the Defense Department official who suggested that corporate clients should take their business away from law firms that represent Guantanamo detainees? (See earlier post.) Well, he has resigned. He said the controversy was getting in the way of his effectiveness. Defense Official Quits in Wake of Remarks About Guantanamo Prisoners' Lawyers, law.com (AP), Feb. 5, 2007.
Courts' Use of Wikipedia
The New York Times had an article this week about courts citing Wikipedia -- which they've done over a hundred times since 2004. Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but Selectively, New York Times, Jan. 29, 2007.
Meanwhile, the Washington Supreme Court cited Wikipedia last week. State v. O'Neal, 2007 Wash. LEXIS 60, (Jan. 25, 2007), Washington courts link, involved the issue whether defendants were "armed" for the purpose of a firearms enhancement for a drug offense when they had guns in their home but were not in holding them at the time of their arrest. When Justice Chambers was relating the facts, he stated that a "loaded AR-15 (a civilian version of the military M16) was found in one bedroom" -- and supported the parenthetical with a footnote citing Wikipedia. This seems typical of the sort of uses mentioned by the New York Times: a side point that might add interest or context to the opinion but is not at all central to the resolution of the case. (Justice Sanders, in dissent, did not cite Wikipedia.)
Justice Chambers cited Wikipedia again on Thursday, this time to support a literary allusion: "As Sherlock Holmes might have said to Dr. Watson, 'It is elementary, my dear fellow,' . . ." PUD No. 2 v. North American Foreign Trade Zone Industries, LLC, 2007 Wash. LEXIS 125 (Feb. 1, 2007)(Chambers, J., dissenting), Wash. courts link.
Thanks: Kris Henderson
Advice from Abe
In honor of Lincoln's birthday, David Giacalone at Shlep: the Self-Help Law Express has a nice post with Lincoln’s message to lawyers and litigators, Feb. 12, 2007.
First SCOTUS Argument
The Oregonian gives a play-by-play account of a Portland lawyer's rookie appearance before the Supreme Court. Can attorney keep his cool before 'hot bench'?, Oregonian, Feb. 12, 2007.
Thanks: Kim Ositis.
Graphic: mw.
9th Cir.'s En Banc Cases: "a noteworthy flurry"
The National Law Journal reports 9th Circuit Steps Up En Banc Reviews, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 2007. It has granted 25 requests for the full circuit to rehear cases decided by three-judge panels between between Dec. 21 and Jan. 23. (In that little more than a month there were three federal holidays, and you might think business would slow down.) Professor Arthur D. Hellman (U. Pittsburgh) says "This is a noteworthy flurry of activity."
Commentators in the article suggest that the Ninth Circuit might be trying to clear up conflicts within the circuit before cases can go to the Supreme Court.
Prof. Hellman is not a casual observer of the Ninth Circuit. He is the editor of Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal Courts (KF8700 .R47 1990 at Classified Stacks). He is the author of a casebook on federal courts and a couple of dozen law review articles on related issues. He has also testified about court organization.
* The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, J. App. Prac. & Process 141 (2006).
* Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, J. App. Prac. & Process 239 (2003).
* Statement of
Arthur D. Hellman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Hearing on H.R. 2723, “The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2003”
October 21, 2003.
Citing Unpub "Opinions" in 9th Cir.
A colleague asked me what the latest was on citing unpublished opinions, so I looked at the Jan. 2007 version of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure with 9th Circuit Local Rules here.
Here's the deal:
* Nationally, all the federal courts have to allow citation of unpublished "opinions, order,s judgments, or other written dispositions" -- BUT ONLY those issued after Jan. 1, 2007. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
* In the Ninth Circuit, you can cite unpublished dispositions from BEFORE Jan. 1, 2007, when they're relevant under the law of the case, claim preclusion, etc., OR for factual purposes (e.g., to show double jeopardy or the existence of a related case) OR in a request to publish them or a motion for rehearing.
* The Ninth Circuit says that, even though you can cite them now, unpublished dispositions still "are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion." 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a).
* When the Ninth Circuit wants a written disposition to be published, it calls it an opinion. There are seven criteria, including that the case establishes, alters, modifies, or clarifies a rule of law, or calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been generally overlooked. 9th Cir. R. 36-2.
* A "written, reasoned disposition of a case or a motion which is not intended for publication" is an memorandum. Memoranda are never "published." 9th Cir. R. 36-1.
* Any other disposition is an order. An order may be published by order of the court. 9th Cir. R. 36-1.
* Only opinions may indicate the judge who wrote them or be labeled "per curiam."
As a practical matter, many of us will continue to refer to "unpublished opinions" when, under the Ninth Circuit's definitions, they're "memoranda" or "orders." The thing to remember is that you can the new ones, but they still have no precedential value.
Questions About McKay's Dismissal
The Seattle Times reports today that U.S. Attorney John McKay got good review 7 months before ouster (Feb. 8). Not only was a Justice Department review positive, but McKay has also received high praise from Chief Judge Robert Lasnick (W.D. Wash.) and King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng. And "the U.S. Navy last month gave McKay its Distinguished Public Service Award, its highest civilian honor, for creating a computer network that enhances the ability of local, state and federal law enforcement to share information."
Another story: Former U.S. attorney McKay says he was ordered to resign, Seattle Times, Feb. 7, 2007. Thanks: Stephanie Knightlinger. And another: I was fired, says ex-U.S. attorney, News Tribune, Feb. 8, 2007. This one quotes Tom Hillier (Federal Public Defender and Trial Ad instructor): "If this was done for political reasons, it shows a fundamental disrespect for the independence of the U.S. attorneys."
DSHS Sued by Foster Kids
Three former and current foster children are suing the Department of Social and Health Services, alleging that their former foster father, who abused them, should not have been licensed or retained his license. DSHS hit with foster care claims, Olympian, Feb. 1, 2007. The foster father, Enrique Fabregas, had a criminal record when he became licensed. During the time he had foster children in his home, there were nearly 30 complaints against him. Many were never investigated.
He currently faces criminal charges (rape, possession of child pornography, sexual exploitation of a minor) and is being held in King County Jail in lieu of $1 million bail.
The plaintiffs' lawyer is David P. Moody, who has successfully sued the state in several high-profile (and big-dollar) cases on behalf of institutionalized plaintiffs. Moody has been a Trial Ad instructor.
See also State facing lawsuit in sexual-abuse case, Seattle Times, Feb. 1, 2007; Previous complaints against foster father ignored, Seattle Times, July 26, 2006.
Robin Arnold-Williams, the Secretary of DSHS, says that the state needs unified background-check process (instead of the 14 statutes that currently govern background checks). DSHS chief: Unify background checks, Olympian, Feb. 8, 2007.
Watada Mistrial
Yesterday the presiding judge declared Lt. Ehren Watada's court-martial a mistrial because of an agreement he signed before the trial. He could be retried. Watada case mistrial declared, Seattle Times, Feb. 8, 2007.
Wanna Be a Prosecutor?
Interested in becoming a prosecutor? See Julie Reynolds, How to Become a Prosecutor, Washington Lawyer (DC Bar), Jan. 2007.
Federal Prosecutors Asking for Privilege Waiver
An attorney writes an opinion piece critical of the Department of Justice's position on asking corporate defendants to waive privilege. N. Richard Janis, Taking the Stand: The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing, Washington Lawyer (DC Bar), Feb. 2007.
DOJ operated for several years under the "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" (Jan. 20, 2003), known as the "Thompson memorandum" after its author. Under the policy, federal prosecutors would encourage corporations and individual corporate defendants to waive their attorney-client privilege and work-product protection in order to be seen as cooperating with the investigation. Now there's a new memorandum in place, the McNulty Memorandum. Mr. Janis, who serves on the ABA's Presidential Task Force on the Attorney Client Privilege, thinks the new memorandum is about as bad as the last. (The views expressed are his and not the Task Force's.)
Alternatives to Detention
Studies show that juvenile detention often does more harm than good -- especially during the period between when being cited and appearing before a judge. The California Bar Journal has an article describing a program in Santa Cruz that has the teens in supervised evening activities plus a weekend day of community service instead of locking them up. It seems to work for the kids -- AND it save the state a lot of money too. An Alternative to Juvenile Detention, Cal. B.J., Feb. 2007.
The program in Santa Cruz is supported by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, whose Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative is working on similar programs around the country. At at the JDAI website, you can find studies showing the results of test programs. There are now about 75 sites in 19 states and DC. Looking at a recent newsletter (Casey Connects, winter 2006), I happened to see that a program in Tacoma (Pierce County) has enabled the county to close a 50-unit wing of the detention center; the county reallocated $800,000 per year to detention alternative programs. Pierce County's diversion program is described here.
Quality of Life at Big Firms - for Women and Men
The cover story in this month's California Lawyer is Malaika Costello-Dougherty, We're Outta Here: Why Women Are Leaving Big Firms, Feb. 2007.
Robert Ambrogi picked up an interesting fact:
Women are leaving large law firms faster than men. But men, it would appear, are jumping ship in greater numbers than ever before. That suggests that Howell's statement about the need for radical change at large firms applies across the board. Men, too, are choosing balance over billables.
Women Lawyers See Generation Gap, Legal Blog Watch, Feb. 6, 2007.
Thanks: Andy Benjamin.
More on the US Attorney Shake-up
The Washington Post has more on "the growing political storm over the recent U.S. attorney firings." Yesterday Deputy AG Paul J. McNulty acknowledged that a U.S. attorney in Arkansas was asked to resign so that the administration could appoint a former aide to Karl Rove, but said that the administration asked six other U.S. attorneys to step down because of "performance-related" issues. Deputy Attorney General Defends Prosecutor Firings, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2007.
This is the first article about the flap that names our local U.S. attorney, John McKay, as one of the ones who was asked to resign. Until now, I'd been agnostic, thinking it was possible he did indeed decide that it was time to leave government service to return to practice or teaching. (When he announced his resignation, he said private practice; later he said he'd teach at Seattle U.) People do decide to leave jobs -- and I imagine the U.S. attorney job is pretty demanding and could leave one craving a break after five years.
Earlier posts: Jan. 28, Jan. 27 , Dec. 15.
For what it's worth, Mr. McKay was one of my favorite law school commencement speakers here. I was sorry to miss his talk at the law school last October.
Thanks: Stephanie Knightlinger.
UW Law Alumnae; Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Last night I went to the UW Law Women's Caucus Second-Annual Alumnae Recognition Reception. Professor Emerita Marjorie Dick Rombauer ('60), an expert in commercial law and legal writing and research, was given the Distinguished Alumna Award. And Justice Bobbe Bridge ('76) received the Outstanding Contribution to Women in the Law Award and delivered the keynote address.
Both Professor Rombauer and Justice Bridge talked about the dramatic difference in the makeup of the law school since they were students. When Prof. Rombauer was a 1L, there were only three upperclass women: one 3L and two 2Ls. When Justice Bridge was a student, there were more women, but still a small minority. Both honorees were firsts: Prof. Rombauer was the first female tenured faculty member other than the librarian, Marian Gould Gallagher, and the first female dean (she was acting dean for a year). Justice Bridge was the first female partner at her law firm (Garvey Schubert Barer). Now (and for the last several years) women are a majority of the entering class.
In her remarks, Justice Bridge related that some people see "the feminization of the legal profession" as a harm, but she spoke of the great benefits. While there will always be a role for adversarial lawyering, she applauded the move toward collaborative lawyering. She talked about the rise of "therapeutic jurisprudence" -- courts that try to solve problems instead of just meting out punishment or addressing one incident only to leave the fertile ground for the next and the next. These include community courts, drug courts, mental health courts, and (although she didn't mention them) youth courts.
For an introduction to therapeutic jurisprudence, see these materials from tne National Center for State Courts:
* William Schma, Therapeutic Jurisprudence (2000)
* Specialized Courts: Problem Solving Courts: Resource Guide (last modified June 26, 2006)
* David B. Wexler, Future Trends in State Courts 2004: Therapeutic Jurisprudence: It's Not Just for Problem-Solving Courts and Calendars Anymore
For more, see NCSC's Problem-Solving Courts Resource Center, which has information about specific types of these courts, help for courts, best practices checklists, and so on. The Problem-Solving Reporter is a newsletter with short pieces about developments around the country.
Problem solving courts (programs using therapeutic justice) in Washington:
* Washington State Center for Court Research (Admin. Ofc. of the Courts), An Evaluation of Unified Family Court Pilot Sites in Washington State (2004) (314 page report)
* King County Drug Diversion Court Program's website
* Municipal Court of Seattle Mental Health Court
* Reclaiming Futures project (youthful offenders with drug abuse and/or mental health problems in King County) post
* Mental health court (post about judge in Thurston County)
* Proposal for homeless veterans' court (post)
* Youth courts (post)
* Chief Judge Theresa Pouley (Lummi Nation), Remembering Indigenous Justice: The Healing to Wellness Programs of Lummi Tribal Justice System, Equal Justice, Aug. 2002, at 3.
(This isn't an exhaustive list -- it's just to give you a sense of the range of projects that are going on.)
9th Cir. OKs Wal-Mart Class Action
Today the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's certification of a class action in a sex discrimination case against Wal-Mart. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 04-16688 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2007), court website.
The class is estimated to include more than 1.5 million women -- any woman who has worked for any Wal-Mart store in the United States in a range of positions ("from part-time, entry-level, hourly employees to salaried managers") from Dec. 26, 1998, to present. Plaintiffs seek class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as lost pay and punitive damages.
Judge Pregerson wrote the majority opinion; Judge Kleinfeld dissented.
The plaintiffs' website for the class is here. The homepage suggests that readers might be interested in a similar case against Costco, which has its own website. The litigation teams are very similar for the two cases (there are 7 firms working on the Wal-Mart case and 5 for the Costco case).
How Washington Picks Judges
From the Seattle Times editorial page editor, an overview of the issues around judicial campaigning: James Vesely, Handpick your judge, or get one picked for you, Seattle Times, Feb. 4, 2007.
Jurisdiction Under Class Action Law
The Class Action Fairness Act allows defendants to remove class actions to federal court under certain circumstances. See Third Circuit Weighs In On Burden Of Proof Under CAFA, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Dec. 18, 2006, for a discussion of a case holding that the defendant has the burden of proof to show that the jurisdictional requirements are met.
Speaking of CAFA, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review has a symposium on it. For link and list of articles, see Just What You're Hankerin' For: A Bevy of Articles About CAFA, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Dec. 14, 2006.
When Will Schierman's Trial Begin?
The prosecution is seeking a delay of 5 months in Conner Schierman's trial, which is now scheduled to begin March 26. Senior Deputy Prosecutor Scott O'Toole is requesting the delay so forensic experts can have more time to analyze evidence from the crime scene. James Conroy, Schierman's attorney, opposes the delay. Judge Greg Canova ordered the prosecution to return in two weeks with declarations showing the reason for the delay. Prosecutor in murder trial seeks delay of 5 months, Seattle Times, Feb. 2, 2007.
Appellate Attorney Sanctioned for Dissing Court
The Utah Supreme Court has declined review of a case and ordered the unsuccessful appellant's attorney to pay attorney fees because the briefs had "a substantial amount of materail that is offensive, inappropriate and disrespectful" of the Court of Appeals. Among other things, the lawyer had said that the Court of Appeals fabricated evidence and was destroying "the moral premise of the legal system." Sanctioned for 'Disrespect', ABA Journal eReport, Jan. 26, 2007.
The sanctioned attorney is Boyd Kimball Dyer, who admitted, "I was wrong, and I deserve the sanctions." In his day job, Dyer is a law professor at the University of Utah.
The case is Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2 (Jan. 12, 2007). The court offers a lesson in civility:
¶21 There is a misconception among some lawyers and clients that advocacy can be enhanced by personal attacks, overly aggressive conduct, or confrontational tactics. Although it is true that this type of advocacy may occasionally lead to some short-term tactical advantages, our collective experience as a court at various levels of the judicial process has convinced us that it is usually highly counterproductive. It distracts the decision-maker from the merits of the case and erodes the credibility of the advocate. Credibility is often directly tied to civility and professionalism. Judges, jurors, and other lawyers are more likely to believe a lawyer who is courteous and treats others with dignity and respect. Counsel in the case at bar would have been far more effective had he focused exclusively on the facts and the law without making his additional commentary disparaging and insulting the judiciary.
¶22 We have sought to encourage the bar to aspire to professionalism and civility in the practice of law through our adoption of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. While these standards are not binding, we encourage members of the bar to study and follow them. Had counsel in the cases at bar observed these standards, he and his clients would not have incurred the severe sanctions we impose today.
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Trial Ad Notes
Tuesday's Lunchtime Choices
Tomorrow has a couple of trial-practice-related programs during the lunch hour:
* Michael Shadow, a well-respected consultant on effective speaking, is presenting a workshop -- courtesy of Career Services and WSTLA.
* Federal Public Defender Tom Hillier is speaking about his experience representing Ahmed Ressam ("the Millennium Bomber") (Forum on Law and Policy).
I wouldn't want to discourage anyone from attending the library's regular Tuesday Library Lifesavers (this week: selecting a database on Westlaw and starting points for foreign and international legal research) -- but these sound very interesting too.
Big Attorney Fees in Katrina Case
Mississippi had worked out a settlement with State Farm over hundreds of lawsuits and thousands of disputed claims following the insurance company's refusal to pay for damage caused by Hurricane Katrina's storm surge. The lead lawyer representing the state was Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, who received a lot of publicity for his work in the tobacco litigation -- and criticism for the size of his fee award. Katrina Suit May Net Lawyers Up to $46 Million, AP (Law.com), Jan. 26, 2007.
Mistrial Declared After Lawyer Failed to Finish Closing Argument
Mistrial Declared After Lawyer Failed to Finish Closing Argument reports the AP (on law.com), Jan. 29, 2007.
The defense lawyer in an attempted murder case in Farmville, VA, returned to the courtroom after a recess and said that he couldn't continue his closing argument because he had lost his train of thought. The defendant offered to finish the argument himself. The presiding judge declared a mistrial and recommended that the lawyer, a 74-year-old former judge, seek medical treatment.
Milberg Weiss Plaintiff Took Kickbacks
A former ophthalmologist has admitted to taking payments for serving as lead plaintiff in class actions filed by plaintiffs' firm Milberg Weiss. Former Lead Plaintiff's Guilty Plea May Spell Trouble for Lawyer Lerach, The Recorder (law.com), Feb. 1, 2007. See Wikipedia for a summary of the firm's troubles.
How to Deal With the Many Types of Anti-Corporate Jurors
Two litigation consultants (Ken Broda-Bahm and Kevin Boully) offer advice on How to Deal With the Many Types of Anti-Corporate Jurors, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 2007.
People who dislike or distrust corporations fall into different categories:
Anti-corporate individualists, who distrust a corporation's level of power and control, will not share the same views as anti-corporate environmentalists, who disparage the side effects of some forms of corporate behavior. Anti-corporate moralists, who focus on corporate dishonesty above all, will not always agree with anti-corporate populists, who value the common person and draw sharp distinctions between themselves and elite executives. Anti-corporate egalitarians, who inherently mistrust profit itself and resulting concentrations of wealth, differ from anti-corporate nationalists, who fear the transnational influence of corporations on so many facets of life.
There even exist anti-corporate capitalists, who are critical of modern corporations precisely because of the high standards they impose for the responsibility of corporations in a self-policing economic system. Bearing in mind these distinctions and many others, it pays to know why a potential juror may dislike a big company, in order to know whether that juror should serve and, if the juror serves, how he or she might be persuaded.
(emphasis added) It all makes sense, but who knew?
The authors offer different voir dire and trial strategies to address each type.
Stimson Quits Over Boycott Remarks
Remember Charles "Cully" Stimson, the Defense Department official who suggested that corporate clients should take their business away from law firms that represent Guantanamo detainees? (See earlier post.) Well, he has resigned. He said the controversy was getting in the way of his effectiveness. Defense Official Quits in Wake of Remarks About Guantanamo Prisoners' Lawyers, law.com (AP), Feb. 5, 2007.
Courts' Use of Wikipedia
The New York Times had an article this week about courts citing Wikipedia -- which they've done over a hundred times since 2004. Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but Selectively, New York Times, Jan. 29, 2007.
Meanwhile, the Washington Supreme Court cited Wikipedia last week. State v. O'Neal, 2007 Wash. LEXIS 60, (Jan. 25, 2007), Washington courts link, involved the issue whether defendants were "armed" for the purpose of a firearms enhancement for a drug offense when they had guns in their home but were not in holding them at the time of their arrest. When Justice Chambers was relating the facts, he stated that a "loaded AR-15 (a civilian version of the military M16) was found in one bedroom" -- and supported the parenthetical with a footnote citing Wikipedia. This seems typical of the sort of uses mentioned by the New York Times: a side point that might add interest or context to the opinion but is not at all central to the resolution of the case. (Justice Sanders, in dissent, did not cite Wikipedia.)
Justice Chambers cited Wikipedia again on Thursday, this time to support a literary allusion: "As Sherlock Holmes might have said to Dr. Watson, 'It is elementary, my dear fellow,' . . ." PUD No. 2 v. North American Foreign Trade Zone Industries, LLC, 2007 Wash. LEXIS 125 (Feb. 1, 2007)(Chambers, J., dissenting), Wash. courts link.
Thanks: Kris Henderson
Advice from Abe
In honor of Lincoln's birthday, David Giacalone at Shlep: the Self-Help Law Express has a nice post with Lincoln’s message to lawyers and litigators, Feb. 12, 2007.
First SCOTUS Argument
The Oregonian gives a play-by-play account of a Portland lawyer's rookie appearance before the Supreme Court. Can attorney keep his cool before 'hot bench'?, Oregonian, Feb. 12, 2007.
Thanks: Kim Ositis.
Graphic: mw.
9th Cir.'s En Banc Cases: "a noteworthy flurry"
The National Law Journal reports 9th Circuit Steps Up En Banc Reviews, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 2007. It has granted 25 requests for the full circuit to rehear cases decided by three-judge panels between between Dec. 21 and Jan. 23. (In that little more than a month there were three federal holidays, and you might think business would slow down.) Professor Arthur D. Hellman (U. Pittsburgh) says "This is a noteworthy flurry of activity."
Commentators in the article suggest that the Ninth Circuit might be trying to clear up conflicts within the circuit before cases can go to the Supreme Court.
Prof. Hellman is not a casual observer of the Ninth Circuit. He is the editor of Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal Courts (KF8700 .R47 1990 at Classified Stacks). He is the author of a casebook on federal courts and a couple of dozen law review articles on related issues. He has also testified about court organization.
* The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, J. App. Prac. & Process 141 (2006).
* Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, J. App. Prac. & Process 239 (2003).
* Statement of
Arthur D. Hellman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Hearing on H.R. 2723, “The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2003”
October 21, 2003.
Citing Unpub "Opinions" in 9th Cir.
A colleague asked me what the latest was on citing unpublished opinions, so I looked at the Jan. 2007 version of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure with 9th Circuit Local Rules here.
Here's the deal:
* Nationally, all the federal courts have to allow citation of unpublished "opinions, order,s judgments, or other written dispositions" -- BUT ONLY those issued after Jan. 1, 2007. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.
* In the Ninth Circuit, you can cite unpublished dispositions from BEFORE Jan. 1, 2007, when they're relevant under the law of the case, claim preclusion, etc., OR for factual purposes (e.g., to show double jeopardy or the existence of a related case) OR in a request to publish them or a motion for rehearing.
* The Ninth Circuit says that, even though you can cite them now, unpublished dispositions still "are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion." 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a).
* When the Ninth Circuit wants a written disposition to be published, it calls it an opinion. There are seven criteria, including that the case establishes, alters, modifies, or clarifies a rule of law, or calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been generally overlooked. 9th Cir. R. 36-2.
* A "written, reasoned disposition of a case or a motion which is not intended for publication" is an memorandum. Memoranda are never "published." 9th Cir. R. 36-1.
* Any other disposition is an order. An order may be published by order of the court. 9th Cir. R. 36-1.
* Only opinions may indicate the judge who wrote them or be labeled "per curiam."
As a practical matter, many of us will continue to refer to "unpublished opinions" when, under the Ninth Circuit's definitions, they're "memoranda" or "orders." The thing to remember is that you can the new ones, but they still have no precedential value.
Questions About McKay's Dismissal
The Seattle Times reports today that U.S. Attorney John McKay got good review 7 months before ouster (Feb. 8). Not only was a Justice Department review positive, but McKay has also received high praise from Chief Judge Robert Lasnick (W.D. Wash.) and King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng. And "the U.S. Navy last month gave McKay its Distinguished Public Service Award, its highest civilian honor, for creating a computer network that enhances the ability of local, state and federal law enforcement to share information."
Another story: Former U.S. attorney McKay says he was ordered to resign, Seattle Times, Feb. 7, 2007. Thanks: Stephanie Knightlinger. And another: I was fired, says ex-U.S. attorney, News Tribune, Feb. 8, 2007. This one quotes Tom Hillier (Federal Public Defender and Trial Ad instructor): "If this was done for political reasons, it shows a fundamental disrespect for the independence of the U.S. attorneys."
DSHS Sued by Foster Kids
Three former and current foster children are suing the Department of Social and Health Services, alleging that their former foster father, who abused them, should not have been licensed or retained his license. DSHS hit with foster care claims, Olympian, Feb. 1, 2007. The foster father, Enrique Fabregas, had a criminal record when he became licensed. During the time he had foster children in his home, there were nearly 30 complaints against him. Many were never investigated.
He currently faces criminal charges (rape, possession of child pornography, sexual exploitation of a minor) and is being held in King County Jail in lieu of $1 million bail.
The plaintiffs' lawyer is David P. Moody, who has successfully sued the state in several high-profile (and big-dollar) cases on behalf of institutionalized plaintiffs. Moody has been a Trial Ad instructor.
See also State facing lawsuit in sexual-abuse case, Seattle Times, Feb. 1, 2007; Previous complaints against foster father ignored, Seattle Times, July 26, 2006.
Robin Arnold-Williams, the Secretary of DSHS, says that the state needs unified background-check process (instead of the 14 statutes that currently govern background checks). DSHS chief: Unify background checks, Olympian, Feb. 8, 2007.
Watada Mistrial
Yesterday the presiding judge declared Lt. Ehren Watada's court-martial a mistrial because of an agreement he signed before the trial. He could be retried. Watada case mistrial declared, Seattle Times, Feb. 8, 2007.
Wanna Be a Prosecutor?
Interested in becoming a prosecutor? See Julie Reynolds, How to Become a Prosecutor, Washington Lawyer (DC Bar), Jan. 2007.
Federal Prosecutors Asking for Privilege Waiver
An attorney writes an opinion piece critical of the Department of Justice's position on asking corporate defendants to waive privilege. N. Richard Janis, Taking the Stand: The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing, Washington Lawyer (DC Bar), Feb. 2007.
DOJ operated for several years under the "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" (Jan. 20, 2003), known as the "Thompson memorandum" after its author. Under the policy, federal prosecutors would encourage corporations and individual corporate defendants to waive their attorney-client privilege and work-product protection in order to be seen as cooperating with the investigation. Now there's a new memorandum in place, the McNulty Memorandum. Mr. Janis, who serves on the ABA's Presidential Task Force on the Attorney Client Privilege, thinks the new memorandum is about as bad as the last. (The views expressed are his and not the Task Force's.)
Alternatives to Detention
Studies show that juvenile detention often does more harm than good -- especially during the period between when being cited and appearing before a judge. The California Bar Journal has an article describing a program in Santa Cruz that has the teens in supervised evening activities plus a weekend day of community service instead of locking them up. It seems to work for the kids -- AND it save the state a lot of money too. An Alternative to Juvenile Detention, Cal. B.J., Feb. 2007.
The program in Santa Cruz is supported by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, whose Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative is working on similar programs around the country. At at the JDAI website, you can find studies showing the results of test programs. There are now about 75 sites in 19 states and DC. Looking at a recent newsletter (Casey Connects, winter 2006), I happened to see that a program in Tacoma (Pierce County) has enabled the county to close a 50-unit wing of the detention center; the county reallocated $800,000 per year to detention alternative programs. Pierce County's diversion program is described here.
Quality of Life at Big Firms - for Women and Men
The cover story in this month's California Lawyer is Malaika Costello-Dougherty, We're Outta Here: Why Women Are Leaving Big Firms, Feb. 2007.
Robert Ambrogi picked up an interesting fact:
Women are leaving large law firms faster than men. But men, it would appear, are jumping ship in greater numbers than ever before. That suggests that Howell's statement about the need for radical change at large firms applies across the board. Men, too, are choosing balance over billables.
Women Lawyers See Generation Gap, Legal Blog Watch, Feb. 6, 2007.
Thanks: Andy Benjamin.
More on the US Attorney Shake-up
The Washington Post has more on "the growing political storm over the recent U.S. attorney firings." Yesterday Deputy AG Paul J. McNulty acknowledged that a U.S. attorney in Arkansas was asked to resign so that the administration could appoint a former aide to Karl Rove, but said that the administration asked six other U.S. attorneys to step down because of "performance-related" issues. Deputy Attorney General Defends Prosecutor Firings, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2007.
This is the first article about the flap that names our local U.S. attorney, John McKay, as one of the ones who was asked to resign. Until now, I'd been agnostic, thinking it was possible he did indeed decide that it was time to leave government service to return to practice or teaching. (When he announced his resignation, he said private practice; later he said he'd teach at Seattle U.) People do decide to leave jobs -- and I imagine the U.S. attorney job is pretty demanding and could leave one craving a break after five years.
Earlier posts: Jan. 28, Jan. 27 , Dec. 15.
For what it's worth, Mr. McKay was one of my favorite law school commencement speakers here. I was sorry to miss his talk at the law school last October.
Thanks: Stephanie Knightlinger.
UW Law Alumnae; Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Last night I went to the UW Law Women's Caucus Second-Annual Alumnae Recognition Reception. Professor Emerita Marjorie Dick Rombauer ('60), an expert in commercial law and legal writing and research, was given the Distinguished Alumna Award. And Justice Bobbe Bridge ('76) received the Outstanding Contribution to Women in the Law Award and delivered the keynote address.
Both Professor Rombauer and Justice Bridge talked about the dramatic difference in the makeup of the law school since they were students. When Prof. Rombauer was a 1L, there were only three upperclass women: one 3L and two 2Ls. When Justice Bridge was a student, there were more women, but still a small minority. Both honorees were firsts: Prof. Rombauer was the first female tenured faculty member other than the librarian, Marian Gould Gallagher, and the first female dean (she was acting dean for a year). Justice Bridge was the first female partner at her law firm (Garvey Schubert Barer). Now (and for the last several years) women are a majority of the entering class.
In her remarks, Justice Bridge related that some people see "the feminization of the legal profession" as a harm, but she spoke of the great benefits. While there will always be a role for adversarial lawyering, she applauded the move toward collaborative lawyering. She talked about the rise of "therapeutic jurisprudence" -- courts that try to solve problems instead of just meting out punishment or addressing one incident only to leave the fertile ground for the next and the next. These include community courts, drug courts, mental health courts, and (although she didn't mention them) youth courts.
For an introduction to therapeutic jurisprudence, see these materials from tne National Center for State Courts:
* William Schma, Therapeutic Jurisprudence (2000)
* Specialized Courts: Problem Solving Courts: Resource Guide (last modified June 26, 2006)
* David B. Wexler, Future Trends in State Courts 2004: Therapeutic Jurisprudence: It's Not Just for Problem-Solving Courts and Calendars Anymore
For more, see NCSC's Problem-Solving Courts Resource Center, which has information about specific types of these courts, help for courts, best practices checklists, and so on. The Problem-Solving Reporter is a newsletter with short pieces about developments around the country.
Problem solving courts (programs using therapeutic justice) in Washington:
* Washington State Center for Court Research (Admin. Ofc. of the Courts), An Evaluation of Unified Family Court Pilot Sites in Washington State (2004) (314 page report)
* King County Drug Diversion Court Program's website
* Municipal Court of Seattle Mental Health Court
* Reclaiming Futures project (youthful offenders with drug abuse and/or mental health problems in King County) post
* Mental health court (post about judge in Thurston County)
* Proposal for homeless veterans' court (post)
* Youth courts (post)
* Chief Judge Theresa Pouley (Lummi Nation), Remembering Indigenous Justice: The Healing to Wellness Programs of Lummi Tribal Justice System, Equal Justice, Aug. 2002, at 3.
(This isn't an exhaustive list -- it's just to give you a sense of the range of projects that are going on.)
9th Cir. OKs Wal-Mart Class Action
Today the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's certification of a class action in a sex discrimination case against Wal-Mart. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 04-16688 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2007), court website.
The class is estimated to include more than 1.5 million women -- any woman who has worked for any Wal-Mart store in the United States in a range of positions ("from part-time, entry-level, hourly employees to salaried managers") from Dec. 26, 1998, to present. Plaintiffs seek class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as lost pay and punitive damages.
Judge Pregerson wrote the majority opinion; Judge Kleinfeld dissented.
The plaintiffs' website for the class is here. The homepage suggests that readers might be interested in a similar case against Costco, which has its own website. The litigation teams are very similar for the two cases (there are 7 firms working on the Wal-Mart case and 5 for the Costco case).
How Washington Picks Judges
From the Seattle Times editorial page editor, an overview of the issues around judicial campaigning: James Vesely, Handpick your judge, or get one picked for you, Seattle Times, Feb. 4, 2007.
Jurisdiction Under Class Action Law
The Class Action Fairness Act allows defendants to remove class actions to federal court under certain circumstances. See Third Circuit Weighs In On Burden Of Proof Under CAFA, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Dec. 18, 2006, for a discussion of a case holding that the defendant has the burden of proof to show that the jurisdictional requirements are met.
Speaking of CAFA, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review has a symposium on it. For link and list of articles, see Just What You're Hankerin' For: A Bevy of Articles About CAFA, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Dec. 14, 2006.
When Will Schierman's Trial Begin?
The prosecution is seeking a delay of 5 months in Conner Schierman's trial, which is now scheduled to begin March 26. Senior Deputy Prosecutor Scott O'Toole is requesting the delay so forensic experts can have more time to analyze evidence from the crime scene. James Conroy, Schierman's attorney, opposes the delay. Judge Greg Canova ordered the prosecution to return in two weeks with declarations showing the reason for the delay. Prosecutor in murder trial seeks delay of 5 months, Seattle Times, Feb. 2, 2007.
Appellate Attorney Sanctioned for Dissing Court
The Utah Supreme Court has declined review of a case and ordered the unsuccessful appellant's attorney to pay attorney fees because the briefs had "a substantial amount of materail that is offensive, inappropriate and disrespectful" of the Court of Appeals. Among other things, the lawyer had said that the Court of Appeals fabricated evidence and was destroying "the moral premise of the legal system." Sanctioned for 'Disrespect', ABA Journal eReport, Jan. 26, 2007.
The sanctioned attorney is Boyd Kimball Dyer, who admitted, "I was wrong, and I deserve the sanctions." In his day job, Dyer is a law professor at the University of Utah.
The case is Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2 (Jan. 12, 2007). The court offers a lesson in civility:
¶21 There is a misconception among some lawyers and clients that advocacy can be enhanced by personal attacks, overly aggressive conduct, or confrontational tactics. Although it is true that this type of advocacy may occasionally lead to some short-term tactical advantages, our collective experience as a court at various levels of the judicial process has convinced us that it is usually highly counterproductive. It distracts the decision-maker from the merits of the case and erodes the credibility of the advocate. Credibility is often directly tied to civility and professionalism. Judges, jurors, and other lawyers are more likely to believe a lawyer who is courteous and treats others with dignity and respect. Counsel in the case at bar would have been far more effective had he focused exclusively on the facts and the law without making his additional commentary disparaging and insulting the judiciary.
¶22 We have sought to encourage the bar to aspire to professionalism and civility in the practice of law through our adoption of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility. While these standards are not binding, we encourage members of the bar to study and follow them. Had counsel in the cases at bar observed these standards, he and his clients would not have incurred the severe sanctions we impose today.
Tuesday, February 20, 2007
I Love You Love...... she's under my thumb"
Under my thumb
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
I Love You Love...... she's under my thumb"
Under my thumb
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
I Love You Love...... she's under my thumb"
Under my thumb
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
The girl who once had me down
Under my thumb
The girl who once pushed me around
Its down to me
The difference in the clothes she wears
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Aint it the truth babe?
Under my thumb
The squirmin dog whos just had her day
Under my thumb
A girl who has just changed her ways
Its down to me, yes it is
The way she does just what shes told
Down to me, the change has come
Shes under my thumb
Ah, ah, say its alright
Under my thumb
A siamese cat of a girl
Under my thumb
Shes the sweetest, hmmm, pet in the world
Its down to me
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Ah, take it easy babe
Yeah
Its down to me, oh yeah
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Yeah, it feels alright
Under my thumb
Her eyes are just kept to herself
Under my thumb, well i
I can still look at someone else
Its down to me, oh thats what I said
The way she talks when shes spoken to
Down to me, the change has come,
Shes under my thumb
Say, its alright.
Say its all...
Say its all...
Take it easy babe
Take it easy babe
Feels alright
Take it, take it easy babe~~
Yeah Babe you Mick Are 1 sick puppy!
Scorned equals a thorn!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul McCartney and Wings
you'd think that people would have had enough of silly love songs.
But I look around me and I see it isn't so.
Some people wanna fill the world with silly love songs.
And whats wrong with that?
Id like to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you,
I love you, I love you,
I cant explain the feelings plain to me, say cant you see?
Ah, she gave me more, she gave it all to me
Now cant you see,
Whats wrong with that
I need to know, cause here I go again
I love you, I love you
Love doesn't come in a minute,
Sometimes it doesn't come at all
I only know that when I'm in it
It isn't silly, no, it isn't silly, love isn't silly at all.
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
How can I tell you about my loved one?
(I love you)
[repeat and fade]
* Paul McCartney lyrics band on The Run
* Here Today
* Hope of Deliverance
* Maybe I�m Amazed
* My Love
* Say Say Say
* Your Loving Flame
* related lyrics Eric B. & Hakim
+ Keep �em Eager to Listen
* Darius
+ Colorblind
* Rod Stewart
+ Forever Young
+ Have I Told You Lately
* Reba Mcentire
+ Mary, Did You Know?
* Tim McGraw
+ Down on The Farm
* Sarah McLachlan
+ Building a Mystery
* Big L
+ Deadly Combination (feat. 2Pac)
Sounds like the Bright Harper Voweley PTA, concealing and distorting exculpatory evidence to create misleading or incomplete knew about the alleged..
after being acquitted in 1986 the loser,James Reginald Plaisted, Former CCISD Psychologist moved to massachussetts.
WHO paid for convicted Nueces county CHIld Mole lester to go to LAW SCHOOL? transplanted to, THE Cardinal Law in BOSTON?Some how Graduated before he was intercepted by an fbi Angel?
John M. Kearney stated: "i didn't spend these past 6(six)" or "(7) seven years in the prosecutor's office for nothing"
concealing and distorting exculpatory evidence to create misleading or incomplete witness accounts of what Moore knew about the alleged fraud; 4 withholding material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment; and disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 18, 1995 Decided September 22, 1995
Nos. 93-5341 and 93-5343
WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR.,
APPELLANT
v.
JOSEPH B. VALDER, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(92cv02288 and 93cv00324)
Paul M. Pohl argued the cause for the appellant. On brief was James E. Anklam.
Robert V. Zener argued the cause for appellees Valder, et al.
Jonathan R. Siegel, Attorney, Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee United States of America. On brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, Department of Justice. Gordon W. Daiger and Robert M. Loeb entered appearances.
Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge; WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant William G. Moore, Jr. (Moore) appeals the dismissal of his Bivens and Federal Tort Claims Act claims against Assistant United States Attorney Joseph B. Valder (Valder), six United States Postal Service Inspectors (postal inspectors) 1 and the United States. Moore sued for injuries allegedly caused by Valder's and the postal inspectors' malicious and retaliatory prosecution of him. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Moore was indicted in October 1988 on various counts of theft and fraud. Moore was chairman, president and chief executive officer of Recognition Equipment Incorporated (REI), a company interested in supplying the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) with address-scanning equipment. The indictment charged that Moore and Robert Reedy, another REI employee, engaged in a scheme to defraud the federal government by persuading William Spartin to recommend for the position of United States Postmaster General a candidate who favored using REI's address-scanning equipment. Spartin was both president of Gnau & Associates, Inc. (GAI), a consulting firm hired by REI, and president of a subsidiary of an executive search firm hired by the USPS to identify a qualified candidate to serve as Postmaster General. The indictment also accused Moore and Reedy of participating in a scheme by which GAI employees paid money to Peter E. Voss, a member of the USPS Board of Governors, in return for Voss's steering business to GAI and its clients. REI had hired GAI at the suggestion of Voss. Five co-conspirators, including Voss and John R. Gnau, Jr., the principal of GAI, either pleaded guilty or testified about the fraud pursuant to a grant of immunity.
In November 1991, at the close of the government's case in Moore's criminal non-jury trial, the district court granted Moore's motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587 (D.D.C. 1989). The district court found insufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that Moore and Reedy knew of either scheme. Id. Moore then filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against Valder and the postal inspectors, asserting a Bivens 2 cause of action for malicious prosecution (malicious prosecution claim) and a Bivens claim for prosecution in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment right (retaliatory prosecution claim). 3 Moore later filed a second complaint in the Northern District of Texas seeking recovery from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq., for the same alleged injuries.
In the two complaints Moore alleged that Valder and the postal inspectors maliciously prosecuted him, even though they knew that he was unaware of the fraud, based on his and REI's criticism of USPS procurement policies and on his recommendations to the President of qualified candidates for Postmaster General. In addition, Moore alleged other misconduct, including claims that Valder told several postal inspectors in the presence of a grand jury witness that he did not care whether Moore was in fact guilty because he wanted to secure a "high-profile" indictment to further his career; that Valder and the postal inspectors intimidated and coerced witnesses into changing their testimony to incriminate Moore; that they concealed evidence of Moore's innocence; that they manipulated witness testimony and presented to the grand jury false, incomplete and misleading written witness statements; that they lost, destroyed or concealed from the grand jury exculpatory information; that they disclosed grand jury testimony to third parties; and that Valder withheld material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment.
The district court dismissed the Bivens claims against Valder, holding that he was protected by absolute immunity. The court denied the postal inspectors' motion to dismiss the Bivens claims against them on the ground of qualified immunity and then transferred the remaining claims to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, concluding that it lacked in personam jurisdiction. The FTCA complaint was also transferred and the parties stipulated to the consolidation of the two cases by the district court here.
The district court first denied Moore's motion to return the complaints to the Northern District of Texas. The court then dismissed the Bivens claims against the postal inspectors because Moore's complaint did not recite direct evidence of their alleged unconstitutional motive and therefore did not satisfy a heightened pleading standard. The court also dismissed the FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the alleged misconduct fell within the FTCA's discretionary function exception.
II.
On appeal Moore contends that Valder is not entitled to absolute immunity; that the court erred in applying a heightened pleading standard to his Bivens complaint; and that the FTCA's discretionary function exception does not preserve the United States's sovereign immunity from liability for the alleged misconduct. In analyzing his claims, we group the specific misconduct alleged by Moore into four categories: pressuring witnesses into incriminating Moore; concealing and distorting exculpatory evidence to create misleading or incomplete witness accounts of what Moore knew about the alleged fraud; 4 withholding material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment; and disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties.
A. Claims Against Valder
The district court dismissed Moore's Bivens claims against Valder, holding that Valder was protected by absolute immunity. 5 We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted but accept the facts as alleged in the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We hold that absolute immunity shields Valder from liability for the decision to prosecute Moore and for some, but not all, of the other alleged instances of misconduct.
In several decisions the Supreme Court has considered whether and to what extent a state or local prosecutor qua prosecutor is immune from liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Court has recognized, the law of immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that in a section 1983 claim against a state official. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials"); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A]ssuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a § 1983 suit against a state official.") (emphasis original). Accordingly, we look to those decisions for guidance.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from section 1983 liability when he acts "as an advocate" by engaging in activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. As the Court in Imbler noted, the common law afforded absolute immunity to prosecutors for several reasons. Immunity encourages vigorous decisionmaking by reducing, if not eliminating, liability's inhibitory effect, id. at 424-25; it protects prosecutors against having "to answer in court each time [a defendant] charge[s] him with wrongdoing [which diverts] his energy and attention ... from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law," id. at 425; and it ensures that judges are not influenced "by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in the prosecutor's being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment." Id. at 427. Alternative mechanisms, such as the trial judge's remedial powers, appellate review and post-conviction collateral remedies, exist to remedy injury caused by prosecutorial misconduct. Id. In addition, there are alternative ways to deter and punish prosecutorial misconduct, such as subjecting the prosecutor to criminal prosecution or professional discipline. Id. at 429.
The Court in Imbler held that "the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983." Id. at 424. At a minimum, advocatory conduct includes "initiating a prosecution" and "presenting the State's case." Id. at 431. 6 Recognizing that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom," the Court acknowledged that distinguishing between action taken as an advocate and action taken as an administrator or investigator "may present difficult questions." Id. at 431 n.33.
The line between advocatory conduct and administrative or investigative activity was refined in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). Using a "functional approach," the Court emphasized that lower courts must look at the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the person performing it, to determine if a prosecutor is clothed with absolute immunity. The prosecutor must establish that the conduct under review was advocatory in nature. Id. at 486. The Court held that participation in a probable cause hearing ("appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a search warrant") is protected by absolute immunity but giving legal advice to police officers is not. "Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct." Id. at 494. The Court warned that "[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive." Id. at 495.
Most recently, the Court discussed the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993). There, the Court reaffirmed that "as the function test of Imbler recognizes, the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor." Id. at 2615. Advocatory conduct protected by absolute immunity "include[s] the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made." Id. But when a prosecutor "performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer," he is entitled only to the qualified immunity that the detective or police officer enjoys. Id. at 2616-17.
In Buckley, the petitioner alleged that the prosecutors fabricated evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime and made false statements at a press conference announcing the indictment of the petitioner. The Court held that the prosecutors did not have absolute immunity from liability for the alleged fabrication of evidence because they did not have probable cause to arrest or to initiate judicial proceedings. Id. at 2616. "Their mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested." Id. The Court emphasized that the alleged fabrication occurred before a grand jury was convened and that when the grand jury eventually was convened, "its immediate purpose was to conduct a more thorough investigation of the crime-not to return an indictment against a suspect whom there was already probable cause to arrest." Id. The Court also held that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune from liability for making allegedly false statements to the press because statements to the media "have no functional tie to the judicial process." Id. at 2618.
Applying these holdings here, we conclude that Valder's prosecutorial immunity insulates him from liability for his unquestionably advocatory decision to prosecute Moore. His prosecutorial immunity also protects Valder from liability for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grand jury to create a false impression of what Moore knew about the alleged fraudulent schemes. Valder's decisions regarding what evidence to put before the grand jury, and in what manner, are advocatory because they are central to the prosecutor's task of "initiating a prosecution" and "presenting the State's case." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; see also Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661-62 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury). In addition, withholding after indictment information that is subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is advocatory. In Imbler, the prosecutor was alleged to have knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court upheld the lower courts' rulings that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from potential liability for the alleged misconduct. As other courts have recognized, it follows from Imbler that the failure, be it knowing or inadvertent, to disclose material exculpatory evidence before trial also falls within the protection afforded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (holding failure to turn over Brady material "after prosecutorial phase" of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence).
Valder, however, has not met his burden of establishing that absolute immunity protects him from potential liability for the other instances of misconduct alleged by Moore. Intimidating and coercing witnesses into changing their testimony is not advocatory. It is rather a misuse of investigative techniques legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the collection of information to be used in a prosecution. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding "acquiring evidence which might be used in a prosecution," in contradistinction to "organization, evaluation, and marshalling " of such evidence, is activity of "police nature" and is therefore not entitled to absolute protection) (emphasis original). "When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is "neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.' " Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)). 7
Finally, disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties is not advocatory because it has no functional tie to the judicial process-it does not contribute to the government's case before a grand or petit jury. Like making statements at a press conference, unauthorized disclosure "does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions." Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2618. 8
B. Claims Against the Postal Inspectors
The district court dismissed Moore's claims against the postal inspectors because Moore's complaint did not allege direct evidence that they acted maliciously or in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech. Reviewing the dismissal de novo and taking the facts as alleged in Moore's complaint, Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276, 1273, we affirm the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but hold that the district court erred in dismissing Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim. 9
The district court did not address whether Moore's Bivens claims alleged the violation of clearly established law. 10 The court, therefore, "erred in deciding the heightened pleading issue before deciding the threshold "essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the defendant complains violated clearly established law.' " Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (emphasis original)). Furthermore, it has not been clearly established that malicious prosecution violates any constitutional or statutory right. 11 Accordingly, the postal inspectors' qualified immunity defeats Moore's malicious prosecution claim. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim, however, does allege the violation of clearly established law. 12
In publicly criticizing the USPS Moore unquestionably exercised his first amendment rights. Record evidence manifests that the criticism produced hostility in USPS management. Joint Appendix (JA) 154-156, 283. Two of the postal inspectors, who reported to USPS management, heard and did not repudiate Valder's declaration that Moore's innocence was irrelevant to the prosecution he intended to pursue. JA 32. These facts taken together constitute evidence sufficient to meet any applicable heightened pleading standard 13 and, accordingly, we remand Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim against the postal inspectors.
C. Claims Against the United States
The district court dismissed Moore's FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the alleged misconduct fell within the FTCA's "discretionary function" exception. We review the dismissal de novo but construe Moore's allegations in his favor. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 14 We hold that only some of the alleged misconduct is covered by the exception.
The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits for negligent or wrongful acts of government employees subject to certain exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The "discretionary function" exception protects the federal government from liability for "[a]ny claim based upon ... the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The exception "preserves the preexisting cloak of governmental immunity for some category of activities." Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). We "must examine carefully the allegations made to determine whether they are sufficiently separable from protected discretionary decisions. If such separability exists, then the conduct of the prosecutor may be actionable under the FTCA." Id. at 515. But where the "allegation of improper investigatory conduct is inextricably tied to the decision to prosecute and the presentation of evidence to the Grand Jury," the discretionary function applies and preserves governmental immunity. Id. at 516.
Deciding whether to prosecute, assessing a witness's credibility to ensure that he is giving an accurate and complete account of what he knows, identifying the evidence to submit to the grand jury and determining whether information is "exculpatory" and "material" and therefore must be disclosed pursuant to a Brady request 15 are actions that require the prosecutor to exercise his professional judgment. They are therefore quintessentially discretionary. 16 Accordingly, the United States enjoys immunity from Moore's claims that Valder and the postal inspectors pressured witnesses into incriminating him, concealed and distorted exculpatory evidence to create a false impression of what he knew about the fraud schemes and withheld material exculpatory information from him after the grand jury returned an indictment.
Disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties, however, is not a discretionary activity nor is it inextricably tied to matters requiring the exercise of discretion. Rather, it is a discrete activity, sufficiently separable from protected discretionary decisions to make the discretionary function exception inapplicable to this allegation. We express no view whether the allegation is otherwise cognizable under the FTCA or whether it is supported by the evidence.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
1 The postal inspector defendants-appellees are Michael Hartman, Frank Korman, Robert Edwards, Pierce McIntosh, Daniel Harrington and Norman Robbins.
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law).
3 The complaint also asserted other constitutional and common-law tort claims which were dismissed by the district court. Moore does not appeal the dismissal of those claims.
4 We do not read Moore's complaint to allege that Valder or the postal inspectors manufactured false evidence to incriminate Moore. The complaint, construed favorably to Moore, alleges only that the written witness statements, prepared by Valder and the postal inspectors and submitted to the grand jury, created false impressions because they omitted important exculpatory testimony. Joint Appendix (JA) 377-78.
5 According to the district court, "Valder was performing judicial and quasi-judicial functions. All of Valder's conduct relevant to this case was preparatory to presenting a case against Moore to the grand jury. The face of the complaint compels the conclusion that all of the acts attributed to Valder were prosecutorial functions...." JA 340.
6 Additionally, "whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present" are advocatory decisions. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
7 And as the Supreme Court explained:
A prosecutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as "preparation" for a possible trial.... When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same ... the immunity that protects them is also the same.
Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617.
8 While we conclude that absolute immunity does not protect Valder, he of course would be entitled to any qualified immunity available to the postal inspectors. Qualified immunity protects a government official who performs discretionary functions from liability for civil damages if he can show that his actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
9 As an initial matter, we reject Moore's argument that the district court here was precluded from reconsidering the Texas district judge's conclusion that Moore had "asserted a set of facts supporting each claim that, if found to be true regarding the element of malice, would overcome defendants' qualified immunity defense and entitle him to relief." JA 343-44. We first observe that the Texas district judge should not have ruled on the immunity issue because he found that he lacked personal jurisdiction over the postal inspectors. More importantly, we iterate that the district court below is bound to follow the law of this circuit. See, e.g., 1B Moore's Federal Practice ("The district courts owe obedience, each to the court of appeals in its own circuit. It may happen, therefore, that a decision in the transferor court is in accordance with the view of the law as established by the court of appeals in its own circuit, but in the transferee circuit the law is either unsettled, or settled to the contrary.... If the issue has been settled ... the transferee court finds itself suspended between the doctrine of stare decisis and the doctrine of the law of the case. In such a circumstance the transferee court would invite reversal if it did not follow the decisions of its own court of appeals.").
10 The parties appear to agree that prosecution in retaliation for speech protected by the first amendment violates a clearly established right. See infra note 12. Although the parties disputed whether the malicious prosecution claim survived the qualified immunity defense, the district court expressly found that it "need not address the question" because of its ruling that Moore's allegations were otherwise deficient. JA 355.
11 See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing with approval cases holding that "it takes more than a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim to rise to the dignity of a constitutional violation"); see also McLaughlin v. Alban, 775 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that plaintiff must "show not merely a mistaken prosecution or even a common law tort, but the violation of a constitutional right" to establish section 1983 claim); Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding section 1983 provides remedy only if plaintiff proves elements of malicious prosecution under state law and establishes that misuse of the legal proceedings was so egregious that he suffered deprivation of rights secured by fourteenth amendment) (citations omitted).
12 See, e.g., Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1255-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agreeing that "retaliatory prosecution [allegedly initiated solely because plaintiff refused to release civil claims of police misconduct against arresting officers] constitutes actionable First Amendment wrong"); see also Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973) (per curiam) (finding first amendment violation in retaliatory prosecution for "nonprovocatively voicing [ ] objection" to police conduct); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) ("An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.") (quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)); Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1990) ("It is undisputed that retaliatory prosecution may expose a state official to section 1983 damages."); Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907-08 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]nstitution of criminal action to penalize the exercise of one's First Amendment rights is a deprivation cognizable under § 1983.") (citing Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1377 (5th Cir. 1979)).
13 In Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we explained this circuit's two-level heightened pleading standard.
14 Because we accept Moore's version of the facts, we reject his argument that the district court should not have decided whether the discretionary function exception applied without permitting Moore an opportunity to conduct discovery and develop a "concrete record."
15 We recognize that internal regulations of the Department of Justice direct that "when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person." Department of Justice Manual, 9-11.233 (October 1, 1990). Putting aside the question whether this regulation creates any enforceable right, we note that deciding what this regulation requires under a specific set of circumstances is itself a discretionary act.
16 We are guided by our decision in Gray where we held that allegations that the defendants "deliberately present[ed] false and misleading evidence to and with[held] exculpatory evidence from the Grand Jury" are within the discretionary function exception because they are "insufficiently separable from the discretionary decision to initiate prosecution." 712 F.2d at 495, 516.
WHO paid for convicted Nueces county CHIld Mole lester to go to LAW SCHOOL? transplanted to, THE Cardinal Law in BOSTON?Some how Graduated before he was intercepted by an fbi Angel?
John M. Kearney stated: "i didn't spend these past 6(six)" or "(7) seven years in the prosecutor's office for nothing"
concealing and distorting exculpatory evidence to create misleading or incomplete witness accounts of what Moore knew about the alleged fraud; 4 withholding material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment; and disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 18, 1995 Decided September 22, 1995
Nos. 93-5341 and 93-5343
WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR.,
APPELLANT
v.
JOSEPH B. VALDER, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(92cv02288 and 93cv00324)
Paul M. Pohl argued the cause for the appellant. On brief was James E. Anklam.
Robert V. Zener argued the cause for appellees Valder, et al.
Jonathan R. Siegel, Attorney, Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee United States of America. On brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Attorney, Department of Justice. Gordon W. Daiger and Robert M. Loeb entered appearances.
Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge; WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant William G. Moore, Jr. (Moore) appeals the dismissal of his Bivens and Federal Tort Claims Act claims against Assistant United States Attorney Joseph B. Valder (Valder), six United States Postal Service Inspectors (postal inspectors) 1 and the United States. Moore sued for injuries allegedly caused by Valder's and the postal inspectors' malicious and retaliatory prosecution of him. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Moore was indicted in October 1988 on various counts of theft and fraud. Moore was chairman, president and chief executive officer of Recognition Equipment Incorporated (REI), a company interested in supplying the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) with address-scanning equipment. The indictment charged that Moore and Robert Reedy, another REI employee, engaged in a scheme to defraud the federal government by persuading William Spartin to recommend for the position of United States Postmaster General a candidate who favored using REI's address-scanning equipment. Spartin was both president of Gnau & Associates, Inc. (GAI), a consulting firm hired by REI, and president of a subsidiary of an executive search firm hired by the USPS to identify a qualified candidate to serve as Postmaster General. The indictment also accused Moore and Reedy of participating in a scheme by which GAI employees paid money to Peter E. Voss, a member of the USPS Board of Governors, in return for Voss's steering business to GAI and its clients. REI had hired GAI at the suggestion of Voss. Five co-conspirators, including Voss and John R. Gnau, Jr., the principal of GAI, either pleaded guilty or testified about the fraud pursuant to a grant of immunity.
In November 1991, at the close of the government's case in Moore's criminal non-jury trial, the district court granted Moore's motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587 (D.D.C. 1989). The district court found insufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that Moore and Reedy knew of either scheme. Id. Moore then filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against Valder and the postal inspectors, asserting a Bivens 2 cause of action for malicious prosecution (malicious prosecution claim) and a Bivens claim for prosecution in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment right (retaliatory prosecution claim). 3 Moore later filed a second complaint in the Northern District of Texas seeking recovery from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq., for the same alleged injuries.
In the two complaints Moore alleged that Valder and the postal inspectors maliciously prosecuted him, even though they knew that he was unaware of the fraud, based on his and REI's criticism of USPS procurement policies and on his recommendations to the President of qualified candidates for Postmaster General. In addition, Moore alleged other misconduct, including claims that Valder told several postal inspectors in the presence of a grand jury witness that he did not care whether Moore was in fact guilty because he wanted to secure a "high-profile" indictment to further his career; that Valder and the postal inspectors intimidated and coerced witnesses into changing their testimony to incriminate Moore; that they concealed evidence of Moore's innocence; that they manipulated witness testimony and presented to the grand jury false, incomplete and misleading written witness statements; that they lost, destroyed or concealed from the grand jury exculpatory information; that they disclosed grand jury testimony to third parties; and that Valder withheld material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment.
The district court dismissed the Bivens claims against Valder, holding that he was protected by absolute immunity. The court denied the postal inspectors' motion to dismiss the Bivens claims against them on the ground of qualified immunity and then transferred the remaining claims to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, concluding that it lacked in personam jurisdiction. The FTCA complaint was also transferred and the parties stipulated to the consolidation of the two cases by the district court here.
The district court first denied Moore's motion to return the complaints to the Northern District of Texas. The court then dismissed the Bivens claims against the postal inspectors because Moore's complaint did not recite direct evidence of their alleged unconstitutional motive and therefore did not satisfy a heightened pleading standard. The court also dismissed the FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the alleged misconduct fell within the FTCA's discretionary function exception.
II.
On appeal Moore contends that Valder is not entitled to absolute immunity; that the court erred in applying a heightened pleading standard to his Bivens complaint; and that the FTCA's discretionary function exception does not preserve the United States's sovereign immunity from liability for the alleged misconduct. In analyzing his claims, we group the specific misconduct alleged by Moore into four categories: pressuring witnesses into incriminating Moore; concealing and distorting exculpatory evidence to create misleading or incomplete witness accounts of what Moore knew about the alleged fraud; 4 withholding material exculpatory information from Moore after indictment; and disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties.
A. Claims Against Valder
The district court dismissed Moore's Bivens claims against Valder, holding that Valder was protected by absolute immunity. 5 We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted but accept the facts as alleged in the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We hold that absolute immunity shields Valder from liability for the decision to prosecute Moore and for some, but not all, of the other alleged instances of misconduct.
In several decisions the Supreme Court has considered whether and to what extent a state or local prosecutor qua prosecutor is immune from liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Court has recognized, the law of immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that in a section 1983 claim against a state official. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (deeming it "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials"); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[A]ssuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a § 1983 suit against a state official.") (emphasis original). Accordingly, we look to those decisions for guidance.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from section 1983 liability when he acts "as an advocate" by engaging in activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. As the Court in Imbler noted, the common law afforded absolute immunity to prosecutors for several reasons. Immunity encourages vigorous decisionmaking by reducing, if not eliminating, liability's inhibitory effect, id. at 424-25; it protects prosecutors against having "to answer in court each time [a defendant] charge[s] him with wrongdoing [which diverts] his energy and attention ... from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law," id. at 425; and it ensures that judges are not influenced "by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in the prosecutor's being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment." Id. at 427. Alternative mechanisms, such as the trial judge's remedial powers, appellate review and post-conviction collateral remedies, exist to remedy injury caused by prosecutorial misconduct. Id. In addition, there are alternative ways to deter and punish prosecutorial misconduct, such as subjecting the prosecutor to criminal prosecution or professional discipline. Id. at 429.
The Court in Imbler held that "the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983." Id. at 424. At a minimum, advocatory conduct includes "initiating a prosecution" and "presenting the State's case." Id. at 431. 6 Recognizing that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom," the Court acknowledged that distinguishing between action taken as an advocate and action taken as an administrator or investigator "may present difficult questions." Id. at 431 n.33.
The line between advocatory conduct and administrative or investigative activity was refined in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). Using a "functional approach," the Court emphasized that lower courts must look at the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the person performing it, to determine if a prosecutor is clothed with absolute immunity. The prosecutor must establish that the conduct under review was advocatory in nature. Id. at 486. The Court held that participation in a probable cause hearing ("appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a search warrant") is protected by absolute immunity but giving legal advice to police officers is not. "Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct." Id. at 494. The Court warned that "[a]lmost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive." Id. at 495.
Most recently, the Court discussed the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993). There, the Court reaffirmed that "as the function test of Imbler recognizes, the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor." Id. at 2615. Advocatory conduct protected by absolute immunity "include[s] the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made." Id. But when a prosecutor "performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer," he is entitled only to the qualified immunity that the detective or police officer enjoys. Id. at 2616-17.
In Buckley, the petitioner alleged that the prosecutors fabricated evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime and made false statements at a press conference announcing the indictment of the petitioner. The Court held that the prosecutors did not have absolute immunity from liability for the alleged fabrication of evidence because they did not have probable cause to arrest or to initiate judicial proceedings. Id. at 2616. "Their mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested." Id. The Court emphasized that the alleged fabrication occurred before a grand jury was convened and that when the grand jury eventually was convened, "its immediate purpose was to conduct a more thorough investigation of the crime-not to return an indictment against a suspect whom there was already probable cause to arrest." Id. The Court also held that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune from liability for making allegedly false statements to the press because statements to the media "have no functional tie to the judicial process." Id. at 2618.
Applying these holdings here, we conclude that Valder's prosecutorial immunity insulates him from liability for his unquestionably advocatory decision to prosecute Moore. His prosecutorial immunity also protects Valder from liability for allegedly concealing exculpatory evidence from the grand jury and for allegedly manipulating evidence before the grand jury to create a false impression of what Moore knew about the alleged fraudulent schemes. Valder's decisions regarding what evidence to put before the grand jury, and in what manner, are advocatory because they are central to the prosecutor's task of "initiating a prosecution" and "presenting the State's case." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; see also Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661-62 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury). In addition, withholding after indictment information that is subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is advocatory. In Imbler, the prosecutor was alleged to have knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court upheld the lower courts' rulings that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from potential liability for the alleged misconduct. As other courts have recognized, it follows from Imbler that the failure, be it knowing or inadvertent, to disclose material exculpatory evidence before trial also falls within the protection afforded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (holding failure to turn over Brady material "after prosecutorial phase" of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence).
Valder, however, has not met his burden of establishing that absolute immunity protects him from potential liability for the other instances of misconduct alleged by Moore. Intimidating and coercing witnesses into changing their testimony is not advocatory. It is rather a misuse of investigative techniques legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the collection of information to be used in a prosecution. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding "acquiring evidence which might be used in a prosecution," in contradistinction to "organization, evaluation, and marshalling " of such evidence, is activity of "police nature" and is therefore not entitled to absolute protection) (emphasis original). "When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is "neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.' " Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)). 7
Finally, disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties is not advocatory because it has no functional tie to the judicial process-it does not contribute to the government's case before a grand or petit jury. Like making statements at a press conference, unauthorized disclosure "does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions preparatory for these functions." Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2618. 8
B. Claims Against the Postal Inspectors
The district court dismissed Moore's claims against the postal inspectors because Moore's complaint did not allege direct evidence that they acted maliciously or in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech. Reviewing the dismissal de novo and taking the facts as alleged in Moore's complaint, Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276, 1273, we affirm the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but hold that the district court erred in dismissing Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim. 9
The district court did not address whether Moore's Bivens claims alleged the violation of clearly established law. 10 The court, therefore, "erred in deciding the heightened pleading issue before deciding the threshold "essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the defendant complains violated clearly established law.' " Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (emphasis original)). Furthermore, it has not been clearly established that malicious prosecution violates any constitutional or statutory right. 11 Accordingly, the postal inspectors' qualified immunity defeats Moore's malicious prosecution claim. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim, however, does allege the violation of clearly established law. 12
In publicly criticizing the USPS Moore unquestionably exercised his first amendment rights. Record evidence manifests that the criticism produced hostility in USPS management. Joint Appendix (JA) 154-156, 283. Two of the postal inspectors, who reported to USPS management, heard and did not repudiate Valder's declaration that Moore's innocence was irrelevant to the prosecution he intended to pursue. JA 32. These facts taken together constitute evidence sufficient to meet any applicable heightened pleading standard 13 and, accordingly, we remand Moore's retaliatory prosecution claim against the postal inspectors.
C. Claims Against the United States
The district court dismissed Moore's FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the alleged misconduct fell within the FTCA's "discretionary function" exception. We review the dismissal de novo but construe Moore's allegations in his favor. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 14 We hold that only some of the alleged misconduct is covered by the exception.
The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits for negligent or wrongful acts of government employees subject to certain exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The "discretionary function" exception protects the federal government from liability for "[a]ny claim based upon ... the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The exception "preserves the preexisting cloak of governmental immunity for some category of activities." Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). We "must examine carefully the allegations made to determine whether they are sufficiently separable from protected discretionary decisions. If such separability exists, then the conduct of the prosecutor may be actionable under the FTCA." Id. at 515. But where the "allegation of improper investigatory conduct is inextricably tied to the decision to prosecute and the presentation of evidence to the Grand Jury," the discretionary function applies and preserves governmental immunity. Id. at 516.
Deciding whether to prosecute, assessing a witness's credibility to ensure that he is giving an accurate and complete account of what he knows, identifying the evidence to submit to the grand jury and determining whether information is "exculpatory" and "material" and therefore must be disclosed pursuant to a Brady request 15 are actions that require the prosecutor to exercise his professional judgment. They are therefore quintessentially discretionary. 16 Accordingly, the United States enjoys immunity from Moore's claims that Valder and the postal inspectors pressured witnesses into incriminating him, concealed and distorted exculpatory evidence to create a false impression of what he knew about the fraud schemes and withheld material exculpatory information from him after the grand jury returned an indictment.
Disclosing grand jury testimony to unauthorized third parties, however, is not a discretionary activity nor is it inextricably tied to matters requiring the exercise of discretion. Rather, it is a discrete activity, sufficiently separable from protected discretionary decisions to make the discretionary function exception inapplicable to this allegation. We express no view whether the allegation is otherwise cognizable under the FTCA or whether it is supported by the evidence.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
1 The postal inspector defendants-appellees are Michael Hartman, Frank Korman, Robert Edwards, Pierce McIntosh, Daniel Harrington and Norman Robbins.
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law).
3 The complaint also asserted other constitutional and common-law tort claims which were dismissed by the district court. Moore does not appeal the dismissal of those claims.
4 We do not read Moore's complaint to allege that Valder or the postal inspectors manufactured false evidence to incriminate Moore. The complaint, construed favorably to Moore, alleges only that the written witness statements, prepared by Valder and the postal inspectors and submitted to the grand jury, created false impressions because they omitted important exculpatory testimony. Joint Appendix (JA) 377-78.
5 According to the district court, "Valder was performing judicial and quasi-judicial functions. All of Valder's conduct relevant to this case was preparatory to presenting a case against Moore to the grand jury. The face of the complaint compels the conclusion that all of the acts attributed to Valder were prosecutorial functions...." JA 340.
6 Additionally, "whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present" are advocatory decisions. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
7 And as the Supreme Court explained:
A prosecutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as "preparation" for a possible trial.... When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same ... the immunity that protects them is also the same.
Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617.
8 While we conclude that absolute immunity does not protect Valder, he of course would be entitled to any qualified immunity available to the postal inspectors. Qualified immunity protects a government official who performs discretionary functions from liability for civil damages if he can show that his actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
9 As an initial matter, we reject Moore's argument that the district court here was precluded from reconsidering the Texas district judge's conclusion that Moore had "asserted a set of facts supporting each claim that, if found to be true regarding the element of malice, would overcome defendants' qualified immunity defense and entitle him to relief." JA 343-44. We first observe that the Texas district judge should not have ruled on the immunity issue because he found that he lacked personal jurisdiction over the postal inspectors. More importantly, we iterate that the district court below is bound to follow the law of this circuit. See, e.g., 1B Moore's Federal Practice ("The district courts owe obedience, each to the court of appeals in its own circuit. It may happen, therefore, that a decision in the transferor court is in accordance with the view of the law as established by the court of appeals in its own circuit, but in the transferee circuit the law is either unsettled, or settled to the contrary.... If the issue has been settled ... the transferee court finds itself suspended between the doctrine of stare decisis and the doctrine of the law of the case. In such a circumstance the transferee court would invite reversal if it did not follow the decisions of its own court of appeals.").
10 The parties appear to agree that prosecution in retaliation for speech protected by the first amendment violates a clearly established right. See infra note 12. Although the parties disputed whether the malicious prosecution claim survived the qualified immunity defense, the district court expressly found that it "need not address the question" because of its ruling that Moore's allegations were otherwise deficient. JA 355.
11 See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing with approval cases holding that "it takes more than a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim to rise to the dignity of a constitutional violation"); see also McLaughlin v. Alban, 775 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that plaintiff must "show not merely a mistaken prosecution or even a common law tort, but the violation of a constitutional right" to establish section 1983 claim); Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding section 1983 provides remedy only if plaintiff proves elements of malicious prosecution under state law and establishes that misuse of the legal proceedings was so egregious that he suffered deprivation of rights secured by fourteenth amendment) (citations omitted).
12 See, e.g., Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1255-57 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agreeing that "retaliatory prosecution [allegedly initiated solely because plaintiff refused to release civil claims of police misconduct against arresting officers] constitutes actionable First Amendment wrong"); see also Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973) (per curiam) (finding first amendment violation in retaliatory prosecution for "nonprovocatively voicing [ ] objection" to police conduct); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) ("An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.") (quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)); Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1990) ("It is undisputed that retaliatory prosecution may expose a state official to section 1983 damages."); Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907-08 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]nstitution of criminal action to penalize the exercise of one's First Amendment rights is a deprivation cognizable under § 1983.") (citing Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1377 (5th Cir. 1979)).
13 In Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we explained this circuit's two-level heightened pleading standard.
14 Because we accept Moore's version of the facts, we reject his argument that the district court should not have decided whether the discretionary function exception applied without permitting Moore an opportunity to conduct discovery and develop a "concrete record."
15 We recognize that internal regulations of the Department of Justice direct that "when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person." Department of Justice Manual, 9-11.233 (October 1, 1990). Putting aside the question whether this regulation creates any enforceable right, we note that deciding what this regulation requires under a specific set of circumstances is itself a discretionary act.
16 We are guided by our decision in Gray where we held that allegations that the defendants "deliberately present[ed] false and misleading evidence to and with[held] exculpatory evidence from the Grand Jury" are within the discretionary function exception because they are "insufficiently separable from the discretionary decision to initiate prosecution." 712 F.2d at 495, 516.
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